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Preface 
 
The material in this report is intended as a contribution by the International Labour Organisation to 
the work of Task Force 8 on employment creation in slum upgrading.  The Task Force was created 
by the UN Secretary General to support the attainment of the MDGs.   
 
The geographic focus of the report is South Africa, and material from the report was circulated to 
South African stakeholders for comment.  The material was also presented to a joint workshop 
organised by the EPWP Unit of the South African Department of Public Works and the regional 
representatives of the ILO. 
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Introduction 
 
The International Labour Office (ILO)’s terms of reference for this report were to: 
 
 “Examine the employment aspects of past, present and future slum upgrading programs in South 
Africa, focusing on labour-intensive technologies, private sector involvement, community 
participation as well as skills development.”  
 
[ILO, 2005] 
 
Since the mid-1990’s, housing has been a major focus of the democratic South African government.  
Housing was a key element of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP, Government of 
South Africa, 1994) and has remained a centre-piece of the government’s development programme.  
During the past decade significant process has been made in the delivery of basic services, housing, 
and stabilising the economy.  However, it is only really in the past few years that the governments’ 
intentions have grown stronger to explicitly use development programmes as a strategy to reduce 
the current unemployment levels of over 30%. 
 
The report traces the evolution over the past decade of employment-related policies in slum 
upgrading.  This is supplemented by two case studies of housing and urban upgrades in quite 
different contexts.  The findings of the policy overview and the case studies inform some 
recommendations on how employment could be improved through South Africa’s shelter-related 
endeavours. 
 
Methodology and limitations of the report 
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The main source of material for the study was existing information in the public domain.  This 
included project reports and external project assessments, policy statements and policy reviews, and 
in some cases academic work.  The material was supplemented by primary research, mainly through 
interviews with selected commentators.  
 
The South African policy environment 
 
South Africa has large developmental backlogs that resulted from apartheid policies, and which 
have persisted in the post-apartheid era.   
 
The collapse of apartheid’s controls on the movement of black people in the late 1980s led to an 
increase in  urbanisation.  Urban centres had provided little in the way of services to already 
urbanised black communities, and were ill-equipped to handle the influx.  The urbanisation of the 
1980s was evidenced by the growth of large-scale informal settlements, overcrowding of existing 
township housing units and hostels, and the pervasive construction of back-yard shacks.   
 
Today close to half of South Africa’s 44 million people live in urban centres.  A third of those in the 
major urban centres live in informal settlements [South African Cities Network, 2004].  Despite 
considerable government efforts to transform urban environments and deal with developmental 
challenges such as education and health, many people continue to live in poverty and suffer a lack 
of access to basic services.  This has been aggravated by unemployment at 50% or more within 
many of the largest urban informal settlements.  
 
Development policies in South Africa have been overlaid by the policy of incremental 
decentralisation to local government of decision-making powers over social and economic 
development [1996 National Constitution, South African Government].  The rationale for the 
decentralisation is that municipalities face the greatest challenge in meeting human needs and 
addressing past backlogs and spatial distortions.  In theory, local government is the institutional 
hinge on which the successful implementation of urban development policies depend.  The 
implementation of the decentralisation policy requires a complex set of inter-governmental 
relations. 
 
After the 1994 elections, the democratic government launched the RDP in response to the country’s 
legacy of apartheid, and to contribute towards the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-
sexist country.  The RDP’s five pillars were: 
 
− Meeting basic needs; 
− Developing our human resources; 
− Building the economy; 
− Democratising the state and society; and 
− Implementing the RDP 
 
[ANC, 1994]. 
 
In June 1996, the Minister of Finance published the country’s macro-economic strategy, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR, Government of South Africa, 1996).  
GEAR argued for market-driven economic expansion and growth.  GEAR aimed to strengthen 
economic growth, to broaden employment, and to redistribute economic opportunities.  GEAR 
focussed strongly on stabilisation (especially the curtailment of expenditure to reduce government 
deficit) and on the rapid liberalisation of trade and industrial policy.  In the first five years of 
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GEAR, these structural adjustments achieved their aims, but also led to considerable formal 
employment losses in the private and public spheres, and reduced the resources available to respond 
effectively to rising social needs. More recently, the long-term social benefits of GEAR have begun 
to be realised, as evidenced by greater budget allocations to social development, lower inflation, and 
a stabilisation of unemployment levels.  
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government produced Urban and Rural Development 
Frameworks in 1996 in order to provide policy guidelines for the development of urban and rural 
areas, especially around infrastructure, housing, and local economic development.  These 
frameworks focused on integration, poverty alleviation, and the redress of past imbalances (du 
Plessis & Napier, 2001).  Similar intentions had been expressed in the Housing White Paper (1994), 
which set out government’s broad housing policy and strategy.  The impact of South Africa’s post-
apartheid housing and settlement policies have been profound.  Since the launch of the White Paper 
on Housing (1994) until March 2005 more than 1.8 million houses were provided to more than 
seven million people.   
 
[Department of Housing, 2005].   
 
Most recently the Government introduced the Comprehensive Housing Plan for the Development of 
Integrated Sustainable Human Settlements - popularly referred to as Breaking New Ground (BNG).  
BNG provides for comprehensive oversight by government in promoting the residential property 
market.  BNG envisages the development of medium-density and rental housing; stronger 
partnerships with the private sector, and the provision of social infrastructure and amenities.  BNG 
aims at changing spatial settlement patterns, so as to build multicultural communities in a non-racial 
society. 
 
In recent shifts in economic policy, government has placed much more explicit attention on 
employment creation.  This initially took the form of a variety of measures such as the Community-
Based Public Works Programme, the Working for Water Programme and others.  These and many 
similar initiatives have now been brought together under the banner of the Extended Public Works 
Programme (EPWP).  The EPWP seeks to generate short term employment and skills upgrading for 
millions of unemployed South Africans.  In parallel, government has proposed a more expansionary 
public programme of investment in infrastructure and services, and this is likely to generate 
employment as projects are implemented. 
Case studies 
 
The case studies show that housing projects can positively influence often missed employment 
processes, if part of a conscious attempt to do so..  The first case, Cato Manor in Durban, was the 
subject of a major urban re-development project co-funded by the government and the European 
Union.  The second case is that of the People’s Housing Process in a small-scale housing project in 
Vosloorus, Ekurhuleni (near Johannesburg).  The two case studies differed from one another in a 
number of respects.  The scale of Cato Manor project was that of a major national project managed 
by a specialist agency, whilst the Vosloorus project is a relatively small scale intervention (although 
quite large in the context of Peoples’ Housing Process projects) managed through the channels of a 
local municipality via an appointed facilitator.  The Cato Manor project was conceptualised as an 
integrated urban development project.  The Vosloorus project on the other hand was a project 
focused on housing provision where local stakeholders sought ways to achieve more integrated 
results.  
 
The tables below summarises skills development and employment creation in the projects. 
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In Cato Manor: 
 
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were 
given temporary employment Activity 
No. 
% of resident 
pop. No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED 2973 3.2% 3644 3.9% 
Housing 2610 2.8% 2610 2.8% 
Infrastructure 0 0.0% 1136 1.2% 
Social Facilities 1369 1.5% 1369 1.5% 
Total 6952 7.5% 8759 9.4% 
 
 
In Vosloorus: 
 
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were 
given temporary employment Activity 
No. 
% of resident 
pop. No. 
% of resident 
pop. 
LED 20 0.3% 20 0.3% 
Housing 530 8.7% 220 3.6% 
Infrastructure 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Social Facilities 27 0.4% 27 0.4% 
Total 577 9.5% 267 4.4% 
 
The key employment-related conclusions from the two cases are: 
Summary of points of comparison 
Issue Cato Manor Vosloorus 
Beneficiary 
participation Moderate High 
Local labour 
sourcing 
High – but some  resistance to 
women 
High – but short-lived resistance to 
women 
Skills High High 
Links to LED High 
Low in the past, but there are 
indications that an LED program is 
slowly evolving 
Sourcing of 
materials Non-local Non-local 
Construction 
approach 
Appropriate technology & contractor 
support system used 
Appropriate technology & contractor 
support system used 
 
 
Despite their very different scale and contexts, the cases have a number of striking similarities.  
These include: 
 
− Some attempts, more explicit in the Cato Manor case, to adopt a holistic vision of community 
development. Improvements in the built, economic, social and institutional environments were 
regarded and managed as integral to slum upgrading and greenfields housing processes but in 
practise this was not always sustained; 
− The use of an emerging contractor development program (as opposed to a simpler labour-only 
basis), and the longer-term benefits of this approach; 
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− The critical roles performed by the development agencies in guiding and sustaining the 
developments; 
− Relatively well-capacitated municipalities supporting the projects. 
 
Recommendations – Opportunities for employment creation 
 
The graphic below lists factors which, impact on employment creation in housing and related 
processes in various ways.  
 
Some key factors affecting employment in slum upgrading/housing projects
Beneficiary 
skills and 
participation
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Beyond attention to these factors, it is also suggested that stakeholders reach consensus on: what 
constitutes employment, and; what should be done to maximise employment in large-scale housing 
and informal settlement upgrades.  There was little consensus amongst those interviewed for the 
case studies of what constituted employment in the context of their projects and in general this 
could range form informal employment for a day to a longer term formal contract. 
 
Most of the sites for housing upgrade are also sites for the incremental upgrade of other public 
facilities, and for social development projects: – construction projects in infrastructure, public 
facilities, housing: – post-construction, the operation, maintenance and upgrade of the public (and 
private) building stock, and: - social development projects such as HIV awareness and upgrade of 
primary health-care networks, local economic development and technical skills training. The 
collective duration of these projects run into many years.  Unfortunately, in the majority of 
development sites, the projects are treated and managed as stand-alone projects, with insufficient 
effort at integrating and coordinating them.  There are opportunity costs of such a non-coordinated 
approach, especially in terms of lost employment opportunities. 
 
If the individual projects that occur on a development site were to be treated and consciously 
managed as components of a longer-term and holistic upgrade program, then potential for 
employment creation is much larger than the if the projects are treated and managed in isolation 
from each other.    
 
Recommendations emerging from the policy overview, the case studies and other secondary sources 
are summarised in the table below.  It should be noted that not all of these are universally applicable 
and in some cases they are already on the agenda of policy makers or urban development 
practitioners. 
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Summary of recommendations 
 
Housing regulations The manner in which regulations are drafted, interpreted and implemented impacts 
on what can be achieved.  Particular attention needs to be directed towards 
release of funds to projects, other funding sources to ensure a balance in the 
funds available for house construction vis a vis other investments in the built 
environment.   
 
Housing policy Policy frameworks send signals to those making delivery decisions.  It is 
suggested that there be a shift away from “units are everything” approach to a 
more integrated approach, with explicit employment and local contractor 
development/sourcing outcomes specified in relation to housing projects. 
 
Matching funds and 
integration with other 
urban activities 
By developing an integrated package of funds, scope exists to leverage 
government resources in a better coordinated manner to achieve targets – 
encompassing skills development, infrastructure, community facilities and 
localised governance.  Alignment of Housing Subsidies, municipal Infrastructure 
Grants and funds for local economic development is essential. 
 
Housing 
implementation 
Numerous decisions are taken at the local level which impact on the nature of the 
housing delivery process itself and its alignment with other municipal activities.  
Active and specialist management of these delivery interfaces could allow for 
further employment opportunities to be identified and acted on.  City-level EPWP 
units could prove useful in this. 
 
Technology, 
equipment and tools 
The technology used in the construction process can have substantial 
ramifications on labour usage.  Guidelines should be developed which specify 
which technology is preferred (note this is closely linked to the fast-tracking issue). 
 
Labour Sourcing of local labour can improve project buy-in by beneficiaries and allow for a 
“sweat-equity” contribution.  There is a need for a community employment 
program that operates in advance of and after the implementation of projects. 
 
Materials The cost of materials makes up a large proportion of the total cost of housing, 
infrastructure and public facilities projects.  Procurement policies and SME support 
programs relating to materials production and materials retailing could generate 
significant longer term employment opportunities.  To realise the employment 
potential around materials production & supply, attention would need to be given 
to contracting arrangements, specialised SME development processes, and the 
practical implementation of the Construction Industry Empowerment Charter. 
 
Local contractors By building the capabilities and survival potential of local contractors, the scope 
exists to improve longer term employment opportunities.  Critical in this is the 
bundling together of the employment opportunities that arise from housing, 
construction and operation of social facilities, and other urban services (such as 
solid waste removal). 
 
Involvement of CBOs Local residents typically seek and expect employment from local construction 
projects.  More effective management of community interfaces, and increasing the 
number of Peoples’ Housing Projects could increase the number of local residents 
involved in the construction, maintenance and operation of built environment 
projects. 
 
Involvement of 
women 
Studies have shown that many beneficiary households are headed by women.  
Often their household duties make it difficult for them to compete effectively for 
employment opportunities. Schemes (e.g. for the provision of daytime childcare) 
should be improved or put in place to enable local resident women to better take 
the employment opportunities that arise from development projects. 
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Skills development Through enhancing skills, the sustainability of employment opportunities is 
improved.  The alignment between housing delivery processes and skills 
development has often not been optimal.  There is a need to better align housing 
projects and skills development.  City-level EPWP units could assist in this. 
 
Working conditions Unsatisfactory working conditions are likely to detract from social development 
gains. The establishment of local labour committees and the adoption of local 
labour charters – as envisaged under Health & Safety regulations – could promote 
better local working conditions and improved local community participation. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The report found that there is considerable potential to improve employment creation in housing 
projects in South Africa.  This is in line with findings in other studies such as those reported on by 
McCutcheon (2001) and Fitchett (2001).  However, the potential has not been fully realised, due to 
the constraints in policies, regulations, administrative processes, management, governance, and 
human capacity.  There are few explicit policy signals linking direct employment generation with 
housing.  Employment-generation is however explicitly encouraged through other government 
departments, but these do not extend to housing policy. 
 
If employment-creation is to become a much more explicit objective within settlement-related 
activity, then it will probably achieve the best results if urban development minimises the 
fragmented and narrowly framed interventions which have characterised human settlement 
programmes in South Africa to date, and instead maximises sustainable and holistic urban 
development models that emphasise community empowerment.   
 
This holistic approach requires far greater alignment of policies, the improvement of regulations, 
much closer inter-government coordination, and greater cooperation between government and 
CBOs, the private sector and NGOs.   
 
There is already some movement in this direction, but a concerted effort is required to strengthen 
and sustain this movement, and to translate it at scale into on-the-ground initiatives.  The ongoing 
capacity development and vigorous financial backing of local authorities will be needed so that they 
can scale up their work with local stakeholders to achieve greater employment impacts in what will 
hopefully remain for some time to come a major focus of government effort and expenditure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This report has been prepared with the intention, as stated in the International Labour Office (ILO) 
project terms of reference, to: 
 “Examine the employment aspects of past, present and future slum upgrading programs in South 
Africa, focusing on labour-intensive technologies, private sector involvement, community 
participation as well as skills development.”  
 
[ILO, 2005] 
 
The rationale behind the commissioning of such as study is that many countries, and in particular 
African countries, are showing limited progress in attaining the development targets of the 
Millennium Development Goals.  Through some discussion of the South African experience and the 
study of two housing / urban upgrade cases, this report offers some reflections on how the drive to 
upgrade urban living environments can be used to increase temporary unemployment relief and 
sustained employment.   
 
Since the mid-1990’s, housing has been a major focus of the democratic South African government.  
Housing was a key element of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994 
(Government of South Africa, 1994) and has remained a centre-piece of the government’s 
development programme.  The RDP, made explicit the need to connect the delivery of basic urban 
services with employment creation.  Subsequent to the formulation of the RDP, the government had 
to contend with major economic challenges, in particular muted levels of growth and rising 
unemployment.  Responses to these challenges, as articulated in polices such as the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (Government of South Africa, 1996), made macro-
economic stability a key priority.  During the past decade significant process has been made in the 
delivery of basic services, housing and in creating a stable economic environment.  However, it is 
only really in the past few years that the intent to utilise government development programmes as 
an explicit employment generating strategy in a context of unemployment levels in excess of 30%, 
as originally articulated in the RDP (1994), has begun to be realised.  Although, despite this 
attention, employment generation in slum upgrading has not necessarily been seen as a major 
priority with a greater focus in programmes such as the Expanded Public Works Programme being 
geared towards bulk infrastructure provision and community-based social programmes. 
 
The report explores this context further and this discussion is supplemented by two case studies of 
housing and upgrading in very different contexts.  The findings of the policy overview and the case 
studies are then drawn on in making some recommendations on how employment gains could be 
leveraged in a more significant manner through South Africa shelter related endeavours. 
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2.  Methodology and limitations of the report 
 
This report examines the national policy context and two case studies.  The selection of the case 
studies was informed by a set of criteria meeting the ILO’s specifications, but also by logistical 
realities facing the report writers in accessing appropriately documented projects and people to 
interview.  The main source of material for the study has been existing information in the public 
domain.  This has included available project reports, external project assessments, policy 
statements, policy reviews, and in some cases academic work.  The material was supplemented by 
primary research, mainly through interviews with selected commentators.  The report also draws on 
the experience of its authors who are active urban development practitioners with several decades of 
collective experience.  Whilst there is a considerable amount of information available at the broad 
policy level, project level documentation is limited and in many cases does not document factors 
around employment as identified as relevant in the project terms of reference.  Where possible such 
gaps have been filled through drawing on the recollections and opinions of various stakeholders 
involved.  It should be noted that the report methodology was constrained, to some degree, by the 
fact that it was commissioned during South Africa’s December-January vacation period and 
therefore not all the most appropriate respondents were available for interviews and in some cases 
material could not be accessed timeously.  
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3.  The South African policy environment 
 
 
3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
“The incontrovertible fact of our transition is that despite achievements in the economy, as a direct 
consequence of apartheid we remain a country with some steep contradictions.  Despite the huge 
public investment into housing over the last ten years of R29.5 billion, apartheid’s legacy remains 
strongly tenacious.  Now it threatens to scupper all that we carefully crafted and worked towards 
since we collectively began the transition in 1994.   
 
Between 1996 and 2001 the number of households living in shacks in informal settlements and 
backyards increased from 1.45 million to 1.84 million, reflecting an increase of 26 percent (a figure 
far greater than the 11% increase in population over the same period).  Approximately 2.4 million 
households live in informal housing structures.   
 
This is worsened by some major shifts in the housing need where households have become smaller 
and more numerous and have become more urbanised.  For, in informal settlements, the basic 
services and infrastructure that is the norm in our developed areas are lacking.  By reason of their 
spatial exclusion individuals and households experience difficulties in accessing all that they had 
been guaranteed as rights by the Constitution, namely; the right to basic amenities such as health 
and safety and security facilities.  Incomes are low, exacerbating the twin challenges of inequality 
and poverty that continually expose the poor to extreme forms of vulnerability.”  
 
[Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Housing,, 22 September 2005] 
 
South Africa has large developmental backlogs that resulted from apartheid policies, but have 
persisted in the post-apartheid era.  The collapse of apartheid’s controls on the movement of black 
people in the late 1980s1, led to an increase in the rate of urbanisation which had previously been 
artificially constrained.  Urban centres were ill-equipped to handle this influx, and had in any case 
generally provided little in the way of services to already urbanised black communities.  The 
urbanisation of the 1980s was evidenced by the growth of large-scale informal settlements, 
overcrowding of existing township housing units and hostels, and the pervasive construction of 
back-yard shacks.   
 
Today close to half of South Africa’s 44 million people live in urban centres.  A third of those in the 
major urban centres live in informal settlements [South African Cities Network, 2004].  Despite 
considerable government efforts to transform urban environments and deal with developmental 
challenges such as education and health, many people continue to live in poverty and suffer a lack 
of access to basic services.  This has been aggravated by unemployment at 50% or more within 
many of these largest urban settlements.   
 
                                                 
1
 Apartheid’s urban controls had originally been imposed through the enforcement of the Group Areas Act 
and Influx Control measures and involved large scale destruction of existing black urban settlements such as 
Sophiatown, District Six and Cato Manor. 
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According to the draft National Urban Policy and Strategy Framework: 
“The Labour Force Survey of September 2001 found that 54.4% of the unemployed in South Africa 
are located in urban areas2.  Statistics for the same year show that of the 7.8 million people of 
working age in the nine largest cities, 38% did not have a job.”  
 
[DPLG, 2004: p19] 
 
 
Policy evolution in the past decade 
This historical context has obviously influenced development policies in South Africa in the past 
decade.  This section seeks to summarise those development policies on shelter provision and 
employment and to describe the degree to which these somewhat separate polices have intersected.  
This policy discussion is not aimed at being exhaustive as there is other material available on these 
subjects, but it does seek to provide a sense of context and highlight key issues pertaining to the 
interaction of housing related development processes and responses to South Africa’s sustained 
high levels of unemployment. 
 
Development policies in South Africa have been overlaid by the policy of incremental 
decentralisation to local government of decision-making powers over social and economic 
development [1996 National Constitution, South African Government].  The rationale for the 
decentralisation is that municipalities face the greatest challenge in meeting human needs and 
addressing past backlogs and spatial distortions.  The 1998 Local Government White Paper [DPLG, 
1998] and supporting legislation proposed the developmental local government theory.  In theory, 
local government is the institutional hinge on which the successful implementation of urban 
development policies depend.  However, the practice required a complex set of inter-governmental 
relations. 
 
After the 1994 elections, the democratic government launched the RDP (Government of South 
Africa, 1994) in response to the country’s legacy of apartheid and to contribute towards the building 
of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist country.  The RDP, developed by the ANC-led alliance 
in consultation with other mass organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and research 
organisations, describes the country’s policies regarding social and economic development. 
 
The RDP focused on five major policy programmes: 
− Meeting basic needs; 
− Developing our human resources; 
− Building the economy; 
− Democratising the state and society; and 
− Implementing the RDP 
[ANC, 1994].3 
 
Under the ‘meeting basic needs’ program, the RDP endorsed the principle that all South Africans 
have a right to a secure place in which to live in peace and dignity, and that housing is a human 
right.  One of the RDP's first priorities was to provide for the homeless.   
 
                                                 
2 Department of Public Works (2003) 
3
 The RDP was developed prior to 1994, and subsequent to the 1994 elections formally adopted by 
Parliament. 
14 of 70 pages 14 
In June 1996, the Minister of Finance published the country’s macro-economic strategy, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy, otherwise known as GEAR (Government of 
South Africa, 1996).  GEAR argued for market-driven economic expansion and growth.  The aim of 
the strategy was to strengthen economic growth, to broaden employment, and to redistribute 
economic opportunities.  However, the strategy was underpinned by a strong focus on stabilisation 
requiring government to curtail expenditure in order to significantly reduce the government deficit 
and to liberalise many aspects of macro-economic, trade and industrial policy in an accelerated 
manner.  This not only generated a process of major structural change in the economy, resulting in 
considerable formal employment losses in the private and public spheres, but also reduced the 
ability of the state, in the short-term, to respond effectively to rising social needs.  Weak domestic 
growth and global economic instability also contributed to the persistence of ‘jobless growth’, with 
an apparent loss of a million jobs between 1990 and 2000 being one of the most unfortunate 
features of a generally optimistic decade (Nel & Binns, 2001).  In addition, some of the early post-
apartheid government programmes experienced operational difficulties consequently did not result 
in the expected scale of job creation.   The table below from the UNDP’s South Africa Human 
Development Report 2003 (2004), provides an indication of the real impacts of South Africa’s 
immediate post-apartheid economic policies on expenditure allocations. 
 
Evolution of general government real per capita expenditure (Rand constant 1995 prices) 
 Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
Category 1995 2002 1995 2002 
General administration 346 422 57 45 
Defence 270 210 0 8 
Law and order 344 376 23 19 
Education 789 715 73 60 
Health 366 373 22 18 
Social security and welfare 184 214 74 64 
Economic services 245 27 85 71 
Total 2,544 2,537 334 287 
[Source: UNDP, 2004] 
 
With this in mind, it is therefore not surprising that according to the South Africa Human 
Development Report 2003 (UNDP, 2004) concluded that, 
 
“In South Africa, unemployment continues to rise unabated. The economy provided only 11.56 
million jobs for 16.81 million economically active South Africans in March 2003, resulting in 5.25 
million unemployed, or an official unemployment rate of 31.2 per cent, which is substantially 
higher than the 19.3 per cent unemployment rate in 1996.” 
 
[UNDP, 2004: p10] 
 
McCord (2004) describes South Africa’s approach to this employment scenario in the following 
manner: 
 
“The Government’s employment strategy is based on two assumptions, i) that economic growth will 
lead to increased employment, and ii) that improved education will to enable workers to take up the 
skilled employment opportunities which will arise as a result of economic growth (EPWP 2004), 
and hence policies are focused around promoting growth and education.  To this is added a public 
works component to provide employment in the short term, pending the realization of increased 
employment arising from growth and improved labour supply.” 
 
 [McCord, 2004: p 3] 
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The sections which follow outline some of the relevant aspects of settlement and employment-
related policies in South Africa’s development agenda in the past decade and seek to identify key 
points of intersection between the two. 
 
 
3.2 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING 
 
The Department of Provincial and Local Government produced Urban and Rural Development 
Frameworks 1996 in order to provide policy guidelines for the development of urban and rural 
areas, especially around infrastructure, housing, and local economic development.  These 
frameworks focused on integration, poverty alleviation, redressing past imbalances through 
participatory planning, and protecting the environment for future generations (du Plessis & Napier, 
2001).  The frameworks aimed to promote urban reconstruction and development, to guide 
development policies and to steer them towards the achievement of a collective vision.  The 
intended results of the frameworks were that, by 2020 South African urban settlements will be:  
 
− “Spatially and socio-economically integrated, non-segregated, free of racial and gender 
discrimination, enabling people to make residential and employment choices to pursue their 
ideals; 
− “Centres of economic, environmental and social opportunity where people can live and work in 
safety and peace; 
− “Centres of vibrant urban governance, managed by democratic, efficient, sustainable and 
accountable metropolitan and local governments in close co-operation with civil society and 
geared towards innovative community-led development; 
− “Environmentally sustainable, marked by a balance between a quality built environment and 
open space; and between consumption needs and renewable and non-renewable resources.  
Sustainable development meets the needs of the present while not compromising the needs of 
future generations; 
− “Planned for in a highly participative fashion that promotes the integration and sustainability of 
urban environments; 
− “Marked by housing, infrastructure and effective services for households and business as the 
basis for an equitable standard of living;  
− “Integrated industrial, commercial, residential, information and educational centres, which 
provide easy access to a range of urban resources; 
− “[Areas which provide much] greater access for rural people to government support and 
information and to commercial services, with a more logical spatial network of towns, services, 
roads and transport systems serving both market traders and customers; and 
− “[Areas which provide close] availability of water, sanitation and fuel sources, giving everyone 
more time for economic productivity and better health.” 
 
[Department of Housing, 1997] 
 
Similar intentions had been expressed in the Housing White Paper (1994).  It set out government’s 
broad housing policy and strategy.  Since 1994, housing policy has evolved.  The current housing 
policy exists within Housing White Paper and the Urban and Rural Development frameworks 
(1996).  The Housing Act aligned the National Housing Policy with the Constitution of South 
Africa and clarified the roles of the three spheres of government: national, provincial and municipal.  
In addition the Housing Act lays down administrative procedures for the development of the 
National Housing Policy. 
 
[Department of Housing, 1997] 
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The impact of housing policy 
The impact of South Africa’s post-apartheid housing policy has been profound.  Since the launch of 
the White Paper on Housing (1994) until March 2005 more than 1,8 million houses were provided 
to more than seven million people.   
 
[Department of Housing, 2005].   
 
Figure 1 Houses completed or under construction March 2005 
 
 
 
[Source: reproduced from www.housing.gov.za ]  
 
 
Breaking New Ground 
Within the broader housing and urban development policy environment, Government has in the last 
decade tested a variety of implementation approaches and plans.  Most recently the Government 
introduced the Comprehensive Housing Plan for the Development of Integrated Sustainable Human 
Settlements - more popularly referred to as Breaking New Ground (BNG).  BNG provides for 
comprehensive oversight by government in promoting the residential property market.  BNG 
envisages the development of low-cost, medium-density and rental housing; stronger partnerships 
with the private sector, and the provision of social infrastructure and amenities.  BNG aims at 
changing spatial settlement patterns, so as to build multicultural communities in a non-racial 
society.   
 
According to BNG, the Government takes responsibility for providing the poorest with income 
levels below R1 500 p.m.  (ca.  € 200) with a full housing subsidy of R 31 929 (ca € 4 600).  The 
poor with income levels R1 500 to R3 500 p.m.  (ca € 200 to € 500) will also receive the full 
subsidy and will be required to provide either a cash contribution or sweat equity.  A newly created 
subsidy band targets middle-income earners – those earning R3 500 to R7 000 p.m.  (ca € 500 to € 1 
000) for whom government will pay a housing deposit.   
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Whilst BNG still needs to stand the test of implementation, Government policy- makers suggest that 
BNG has the following advantages:  
 
− There will be greater flexibility in delivery systems, the lack of which previously constrained 
delivery  
− The role of the private sector will be enhanced through the collapsing of subsidy bands, and the 
removal of blockages relating to down-payments for indigents and pensioners.  A fixed rate and 
other new loan products will be developed, including an option to convert the capital grant into 
an annuity.   
− Barriers to housing trade will be removed through amendments to the Housing Act, 1997 (Act 
107 of 1997), so as to reduce from eight to five years the period during which resale on the 
private market is prohibited.   
− Registration of title will be prioritised for houses constructed under the existing Housing 
Programme.   
− All housing programmes will focus on replacing informal settlements with more adequate forms 
of housing.   
− Greater co-ordination will be effected between national, provincial and local government.  An 
Inter-Ministerial Committee will oversee the implementation of BNG. 
 
Other initiatives to be carried out in terms of BNG include land acquisition through the proactive 
identification and acquisition of land through the Public Works Asset Register, the State Land 
Register and the Environmental Potential Atlas.  The Plan will be implemented from April 2005.4 
 
 
The housing Social Contract 
Significant within the BNG commitments is the Social Contract that was approved by major 
housing-related stakeholders in 2005.  The Social Contract included a number of commitments to 
leverage housing-related processes for economic and social gain (see italicised sections below). 
 
“We the signatories undertake to work together to: 
 
a. “Unblock the impediments constraining a fast-tracked process of housing delivery; 
b. “Enable rapid release of land that is well located, for the purpose of creating sustainable and 
viable communities; 
c. “Create a sustainable and a viable new and secondary housing market; 
d. “Extend access to affordable finance and, where possible, with shorter repayment periods for all 
South Africans; 
e. “Mobilize communities to be active participants within the construction processes through the 
provision of technical support and skills development; 
f. “Enable the individuals and families to use their homes as assets to create wealth; 
g. “Actively promote the empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals, especially 
women and youth; and 
h. “Develop policies and mechanisms to deal with HIV/AIDS in housing, and access to housing 
finance. 
 
                                                 
4
 It is worth noting that a practice note issued by the Dept of Housing ca May 2005 (on the topic of the new 
subsidy quantum for the 2006 financial year) refers to an intention that land for housing will be paid for 
separately from the housing subsidy.  This presents an opportunity to ensure a greater level of investment in 
the top structure. 
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“In addition, we, the signatories undertake to work together to mobilize the required resources to 
achieve the following elements of the Human Settlements Plan: 
 
a. ”Accelerating the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty alleviation; 
b. “Utilising provision of housing as a major job creation strategy; 
c. “Ensuring property can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth creation and empowerment; 
d. “Leveraging growth in the economy; 
e. “Combating crime, promoting social cohesion and improving the quality of life of the poor in 
safe and secure environments; 
f. “Supporting the functioning of the entire single residential property market to reduce the duality 
within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first and second economy; 
g. “Utilizing housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human settlements, in 
support of spatial restructuring, and 
h. ”Ensuring, as a matter of urgency, the extension of adequate water, sanitation and hygiene, 
lighting and energy, such as electricity, to all.” 
 
[Department of Housing, 2005, italics by the authors of this report] 
 
To date it appears the commitment in the Social Contract under the “Breaking New Ground” 
framework has yielded little in specific commitments.  The bulk of attention appears, at present, to 
be placed on escalating private sector commitments and improving access to finance on the one 
hand and promoting integration of housing with other urban processes on the other.  Nevertheless, 
the presence of this explicit commitment does create the space to conceptualise projects which 
begin systematically make employment creation a critical focus.   
 
 
The People’s Housing Process (PHP) 
In housing delivery, some emphasis has been placed on projects implemented under the PHP.  The 
PHP methodology regards as advantages the involvement of beneficiary communities in the 
housing process as labour or as contractors in the delivery of shelter (commonly referred to as ‘top-
structures’) and associated services.   
 
The establishment of partnerships, the transfer of skills, community empowerment and a process 
that is people-driven were some of the key principles underlying this policy.  The policy was 
introduced in 1998. 
 
The People’s Housing Process “aims to support households who wish to enhance their subsidies by 
building or organising the building of their homes themselves.  The process assists such households 
to access:  
 
− “Housing subsidies  
− “Technical, financial, logistical and administrative support regarding the building of their 
homes, on a basis that is sustainable and affordable” 
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
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Under the PHP beneficiaries can:  
 
− “save on labour costs by doing some of the building work themselves or by getting their 
neighbours, friends and families or other persons to help them;  
− “avoid having to pay a profit element to developers if they build houses themselves or organise 
for those houses to be built;  
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
 
The PHP is a delivery mechanism (as opposed to a type of subsidy).  With some minor 
modifications, it utilises the same housing subsidy types (Greenfields, Consolidation, Institutional et 
al) that are available for delivery of housing stock via more conventional mechanisms. 
 
Statistics on delivery (houses built or under construction) via the PHP mechanism could not be 
readily located during the research period.  However, an alternative indicator of scale of the use of 
the PHP mechanism is the number of subsidy approvals.  By March 2004, subsidies approved for 
delivery via PHP totalled 272 165 (since the inception of the PHP mechanism in 1998).  This 
represented 11.17% of all of the 2 436 404 housing subsidies approved from 1994 to 2004.   
 
It is presently unclear if the proportion of subsidies to be delivered via PHP will remain at this level, 
increase, or decrease.  There does not appear to be an express strategy at a national level as the 
relative emphasis to be placed on the PHP mechanism.  The implication appears to be that the 
various Provincial Housing Departments and-or municipalities will individually set their own 
particular approach as to the relative weight on PHP compared to other delivery mechanisms.  
Systematic research was not however undertaken to determine each province’s or selected 
municipalities’ PHP intentions.   
 
However, as the opinion below suggests, progress in scaling up the PHP has been rather 
disappointing: 
 
“Although the PHP has been part of national housing policy since 1998, most provinces have 
disregarded it in favour of project-based, developer-driven delivery.  Only a tiny proportion of 
houses built to date have been delivered via the PHP.  The official PHP policy framework is vague 
and contradictory, both internally and in relation to other policy frameworks such as the urban 
planning process and building norms and standards.  Moreover, the institutional home of the PHP in 
government, the People’s Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT), is under-resourced and politically 
marginalised.”  
 
[Baumann, 2003] 
 
BNG has placed some emphasis on scaling up PHP projects.  Some Provinces suggest that they will 
increase their PHP targets.  At the time of writing there was however no numerical indication of 
increased resources for PHP to suggest that this will receive the intended attention. 
 
 
Urban renewal programmes 
Beyond housing-related matters government has also given significant attention to matters or urban 
renewal since the policy frameworks of the mid 1990s.  Urban development programmes more 
generally have been informed by polices developed by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government.  Early flagship interventions under the urban policy frameworks focused on the 
Special Integrated Presidential Projects (SIP Projects).  The aim of the SIP Projects was to kick-start 
20 of 70 pages 20 
development in major urban areas, focusing on violence-torn communities and those in crisis.  
These selected interventions were also seen to provide an opportunity for donor funds to be raised 
in support of national priority interventions.  It was developed to ensure an integrated approach to 
the provision of infrastructure, housing, community and recreation facilities, and job opportunities.  
The SIP Projects aimed to transform previously disadvantaged communities and create sustainable 
and habitable living environments.  Projects that received attention under this programme included:  
 
− Eastern Cape: Duncan Village and Ibhayi  
− Free State: Thabong  
− Gauteng: Katorus  
− KwaZulu-Natal: Cato Manor  
− Limpopo: Mahwelereng  
− Mpumalanga: Masoyi and Siyabuswa  
− Northern Cape: Galeshewe  
− North West: Molopo River Basin  
− Western Cape: Integrated Service Land Project in the Cape Metropolitan Area.   
 
It was intended that these projects would include the provision of housing, infrastructure (such as 
roads and the provision of electricity and street-lighting) upgrading, and the upgrading of social 
infrastructure (child-care facilities, schools, clinics, sports fields, libraries, police stations, and 
centres for the aged, post offices and playgrounds).  Providing areas for markets, community 
gardens and skills training creates opportunities for business development.  These activities are 
planned and implemented in an integrated manner to ensure sustainable and habitable living 
environments. 
 
In addition to these activities the DPLG has administered a series of grant funds for local 
governments with the aim that they make applications for particular initiatives.  These included the 
Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) and the Local Economic Development 
(LED) Fund.  More recently the DPLG launched the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) in 
August 2004.  This is aimed at fast tracking improved service delivery from municipalities.  The 
R15,6-billion grant fund is aimed at encouraging economic development at municipal level and 
improving service from local government.  Approximately R4,4 billion has been allocated for the 
2004/2005 financial year for municipalities to invest in basic services and infrastructure – above the 
projections made in 2004 in the table below.  This amount will increase to R6 billion for the 
2006/2007 financial year.  Data from 2003 national budget allocations to municipalities is reflected 
in the table below.  These figures exclude housing as this is funded via a grant to provincial 
governments.  The scale of housing-related transfers, via the National Department of Housing, to 
provincial and local governments is significant and has amounted to R32.4 billion since the 
1994/1995 budget year (up to and including 2004/2005) (National Treasury, 2005: p 67).  The 
annual housing grant to provinces amounted to R4.5 billion in 2004/2005 (ibid: p69). 
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Figure 3: National government transfers to local government (2003) 
 
[Source: reproduced from National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal review, 2004: p12] 
 
The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) is a conditional grant to support municipal capital 
budgets in order to fast track service delivery at municipal level.  The grant allows government to 
expand and improve the quality of service delivery relating to water provision, sanitation, roads, 
solid waste and lighting.  The MIG has been set up to facilitate the merger of the following funding 
programmes: 
 
− Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme, in support of internal bulk, connector 
infrastructure and community facilities to poor households;  
− Water Service Capital Fund, in support of bulk, connector and internal infrastructure for water 
services at a basic level;  
− Community Based Extended Public Works Programme, in support of the creation of community 
assets in rural, historically disadvantaged communities;  
− Local Economic Development Fund, in support of planning, and implementation of job creation 
and poverty alleviation;  
− Sport and Recreation Programme, in support of the provision and operation of sport and 
recreation facilities within disadvantaged communities; and  
− Electrification funding, in support of addressing the electrification backlog of permanently 
occupied residential dwellings that are situated in historically under-supplied areas.   
 
The MIG is an infrastructure transfer mechanism and is aimed at making the system of transfers to 
municipalities more efficient, designed to support the capital budgets of municipalities, and to 
facilitate integrated development planning.  As the MIG is designed to complement the capital 
budgets of municipalities rather than to fund individual projects, reporting on spending is therefore 
on the entire capital budget of municipalities.  Individual national line departments will therefore 
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continue to lead the monitoring and support of implementation in their specific functions and 
priorities 
 
The MIG has an overall target of removing the backlog with regard to access to basic municipal 
services over a 10-year period.  It is estimated that the infrastructure investment programme for all 
municipal infrastructure over a 10-year period requires an investment of R56 billion, of which an 
estimated R38 billion is assumed to be MIG-funded with the remainder provided through the 
Housing Subsidy. 
 
What is noteworthy about the MIG in the context of this study is the degree to which conditions for 
approved projects have been integrated with the goals of the Extended Public Works Programme 
and its aims of generating employment (see discussion of EPWP below). 
 
A similar emphasis on linking urban development policy to economic growth and employment 
creation can be found in draft versions of the revised urban development framework (2005) being 
tabled by the DPLG with the cabinet at the time of the writing of this report.  However, the 
emerging documentation around urban development policies does make explicit the opportunity that 
exists to link employment creation to the urban development process (housing and services) and 
tends to talk more generally about the need to stimulate economic activity in the urban environment 
through more traditional LED-type approaches. 
 
The relative importance of making this connection is best made when looking at the allocations of 
government capital expenditure at the local level.  The figure below makes the point very clearly 
that housing has been and remains a dominant category of state expenditure at the local level and 
such does require attention in terms of its employment generation impacts in addition to the 
sustainability issues that are now characterising urban development debates in the country. 
 
Figure 4: Total budgeted expenditure on infrastructure in SA municipalities 
 
[Source: reproduced from National Treasury Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2004:p 34] 
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3.3 GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
The government has, since 1994, in many ways staked its reputation on attempts to initially stabilise 
the economy so poorly mismanaged under apartheid and then to turn-around the country’s 
economic fortunes to meet the goals of redistribution and growth.  Whilst the RDP emphasised 
growth through redistribution,  with the adoption of the GEAR framework emphasis shifted to 
redistribution through growth.  GEAR identified the following goals as requiring significant 
attention: 
 
− A competitive and fast-growing economy which creates enough jobs for all work-seekers;  
− A redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor;  
− A society in which sound health, education and other services are available to all; and 
− An environment in which homes are secure and places of work are productive  
 
[National Treasury, 1996] 
 
However, GEAR itself focused almost entirely on the economic dimensions and had three core 
strategies.  Firstly, it aimed at promoting growth through exports.  Secondly it aimed at increasing 
local and foreign investments through the creation of an attractive and stable domestic investment 
environment.  Thirdly, it promoted wealth redistribution by creating jobs, and reallocating resources 
(via budget reforms)in order to make adequate provision for essential services like water, housing, 
education, social services and health (National Treasury, 1996; Dept of Housing, 1997). 
 
GEAR stabilised the economy but did not yield expected levels of foreign direct investment.  
Increases in domestic investment and levels of growth and employment remained muted for much 
of the 1990s.  Figure 3.2 provides a stark illustration of the situation where despite some job 
creation, levels of unemployment rose rapidly during this period.   
 
Figure 5 Employment and unemployment levels 1996-2003 
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Government efforts in the late 1990s to address the economic situation did not enjoy the same level 
of support from its social partners as it had in the early 1990s.  A series of Presidential summits 
sought to secure commitments from government, business, labour and NGOs to seek innovative 
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ways to increase levels of employment.  Out of these summits government launched a series of 
Special Employment Programmes with public funding that would, it hoped, generate employment 
alongside its commitments to the growth strategy. 
 
Over the coming years, the package of Special Employment Programmes will be dramatically 
expanded, with greater attention paid to the finance stream, improved coordination of activities, 
sustainability, training and the contribution to local economic activity.  The six programmes to be 
given priority include: 
 
− Clean Cities Campaign 
Currently there are an estimated 15 000 employees in the waste management industry.  A 
National Waste Management Strategy is currently being developed, with an emphasis on 
promoting SMMEs in order to increase the potential for the creation of jobs through the delivery 
of waste services to poorly serviced areas.  The Clean Cities Campaign will implement 
municipal waste collection in poorly serviced areas, linking into small recycling operations to 
facilitate the sustainability of the programme.  The Campaign will also enable the creation and 
maintenance of recreation facilities and support some inner-city building rehabilitation. 
 
− Working for Water 
Working for Water is a short-term job creation and conservation project that provides 
employment through the clearing and controlling of invasive alien vegetation.  Approximately 
38 000 direct short term jobs have been created since project implementation with the majority 
of those employed being rural women in KwaZulu/Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, 
Northern Province and Mpumalanga.   
 
[www.dwaf.gov.za/wfw/] 
 
− Land Care Campaign 
The Land Care Campaign is a community-based programme supported by both the public and 
private sectors through a series of partnerships.  It focuses on the rehabilitation and conservation 
of natural resources (soil, water sources and vegetation) through sustainable utilisation and the 
creation of a conservation ethic through education and awareness.  In addition, it seeks to 
address rural poverty through sustainable job creation.  The Land Care Campaign reinforces the 
Working for Water Programme by supporting social upliftment and contributing to sustainable 
job creation and the development of entrepreneurial skills. 
 
− Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
The Municipal Infrastructure Programme (MIP) and Community Water and Sanitation 
Programmes channel capital subsidies to investment in basic service infrastructure for low-
income households and towards the rehabilitation of collapsed infrastructure in previously 
disadvantaged areas.  It is connected to the housing subsidy programme in its provision of bulk 
infrastructure in municipalities for low-income housing projects.  The MIP has an urban focus 
although about one-quarter of the funds are spent in rural areas. 
 
[www.dplg.gov.za] 
 
− Welfare Programmes 
Government’s aim appears to be to redirect welfare spending away from programmes that 
promote dependency towards those that make social investments by building human resources 
and social assets.  The Department of Welfare has embarked on several initiatives to make the 
shift towards this developmental welfare agenda.  Based on the poverty profiles of provinces, it 
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has designed a social development programme that includes the pilot Flagship Programme for 
Unemployed Women with Children Under Five.  These projects are meant to offer opportunities 
for unemployed, poor rural women with young children to break out of hardship and poverty by 
providing training, education and social resources. 
 
− Community Based Public Works Programmes (CBPWP) 
The CBPWP is aimed at poverty alleviation through job creation, primarily focused on the rural 
poor.  The objectives are to create short-term employment opportunities for community 
members by means of construction of public assets within poor, disadvantaged areas.  
Sustainability of these employment opportunities will be extended through the facilitation of 
micro business opportunities associated with the community assets created.  Recent evaluation 
has shown that this programme has successfully reached poor communities, as demonstrated by 
those employed and trained, and by the spatial distribution of activities.  Over 900 projects have 
been implemented, mainly in rural areas, creating about 41 650 person-years of employment.  In 
1998/9, the programme focused on creating productive assets and assets that improve access to 
markets for rural communities.  A greater emphasis will be placed on improving coordination 
with an emphasis on social assistance and the development of sustainable community assets.  
The aim is to improve coordination and spatial targeting of initiatives to reduce waste and 
dramatically enhance the effectiveness of each programme (NEDLAC) 
 
− Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
Like the CBPWP, the primary focus of the EPWP is the creation of temporary employment 
through the construction of public assets.  Unlike the CBPWP program, the EPWP does not 
focus only on the alleviation of rural poverty.  The EPWP is a successor program to the CPWP, 
and was established in 2004.  The EPWP is overseen through a special unit in the Department of 
Public Works, but it is implemented largely through reorientation of existing budgets in the 
different spheres of government.  The Programme's objectives are to use existing government 
and public entity budgets to reduce and alleviate unemployment and increase the ability of 
workers to earn an income, either through the labour market or through entrepreneurial activity.  
The goal is to alleviate unemployment for a minimum of one million people (at least 60% 
women, 30% youth and 2% disabled people) in South Africa between 2004 and 2009 
(www.dpw.gov.za).5   
 
According to the Department of Public Works,  “The EPWP is one of an array of government 
strategies aimed at addressing unemployment. The fundamental strategies are to increase 
economic growth so that the number of net new jobs being created starts to exceed the number 
of new entrants into the labour market, and to improve the education system such that the 
workforce is able to take up the largely skilled work opportunities which economic growth will 
generate. In the meantime, there is a need to put in place short- to medium-term strategies. The 
EPWP forms one of government’s short-to medium-term strategies.” 
 
[Department of Public Works, 2003 as quoted in McCord, 2004: p 7]. 
 
The EPWP focuses on 4 sectors: 
 
                                                 
5
 A leading project under this programme (and first initiated under the CBPW programme) is the African 
Renaissance Road Building project in rural KwaZulu-Natal.  Its Zibambele project is one of a number of 
initiatives which have empowered low income rural communities to undertake maintenance and repair 
contracts on rural roads.   
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 Infrastructure programme: This programme focuses on creating employment through civil 
works projects employing labour-intensive methods of construction.  Approximately 37,000 
km of roads, 31,000 km of pipelines, 1,500 km of storm water drains and 150 km of urban 
sidewalks will be constructed.  This will result in 750,000 temporary employment 
opportunities for targeted unemployed people in the areas where the projects take place.  
(Since the average duration of these projects is four months, this translates to 250,000 
person-years of employment.) All the workers employed on these projects will receive 
training, funded by the Department of Labour.   
 
 Economic programme: The economic sector's learnership programme aims to include 3,000 
unemployed people in entrepreneurship learnerships over the next five years.  It is estimated 
that each micro-enterprise established will employ an additional three people.  The 
Learnership programme will help aspiring entrepreneurs to develop the skills and experience 
needed to set up SMMEs.  Learners will be registered on full-time Sector Education and 
Training Authority (SETA) funded learnerships and supported to set up micro-business.  
Learning contracts will provide practical experience for learners.  The learners will graduate 
from their learnerships with a National Qualifications Framework qualification, the 
necessary technical knowledge to run their businesses, knowledge of how to tender for 
public sector projects, knowledge of how to run a business, experience, and a credit track 
record. 
 
 Environmental programme: Approximately 202 000 temporary jobs will be created through 
programmes such as: 
 
Land Care programme 
People and Parks initiative 
Coastal Care programme 
Sustainable Land-based Livelihoods project 
Cleaning up SA programme 
Growing a Tourism Economy programme 
Working for Water 
Wetlands project 
Fire programme 
 
The Fire programme will result in the clearing of alien vegetation from 200,000 hectares of 
land, rehabilitation of 40 wetlands, the creation of 20 fire protection associations, clean up of 
700 kilometres of coast, rehabilitation of 10,000 hectares of land, creation of 32 waste 
management programmes and creation of 150 historical and community tourism projects. 
 
 Social Development Programme: Two programmes in the social development sector have 
been earmarked for the EPWP for 2004/5: 
 
Home Community Based Care  
Early Childhood Development 
 
The Home Community Based Care programme aims to create 122,240 temporary work 
opportunities (17,400 of which will be through learnerships) over five years through a three 
pronged programme run in partnership with the Health and Welfare Sector Education 
Authority.  The Early Childhood Development programme aims to develop skills amongst 
19,800 childcare practitioners over a period of five years, thereby increasing their capacity 
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to generate an income and at the same time improve the care and learning environment of 
our children. 
 
− Employment Strategy Framework (ESF) 
Framed within the context of Government’s macro-economic targets, the Employment Strategy 
Framework (ESF) was launched in early 2005 and focuses on ways of raising the demand for, 
and the employability of, labour.  The ESF has a short-term goal to directly and indirectly 
promote the creation of sufficient numbers of jobs to match net growth in the labour force.  This 
will be done through the support and expansion of the Special Employment Programmes to raise 
the level of job creation as quickly as possible.  Even where these are short-term employment 
generators, they will focus on building important community assets and reinforcing 
programmes, aimed at generating longer-term economic opportunities. 
 
In the medium to long term, the strategy aims to fundamentally propel the South African 
economy into one which is innovative, inclusive and labour absorbing by raising the skills base 
and move into higher value-added sectors to raise national income, enable a more stable 
exchange rate and to better reflect our underlying cost structure.   
 
To increase the demand for labour, emphasis in policy documents has been placed on:  
 
 Expanding the creation of sustainable formal sector employment through the identification 
and promotion of higher value added, more labour using industries, with strong employment 
multiplier potential. 
 Preserving sustainable jobs in traditional sectors by identifying strategies with respect to 
work organisation, products and markets. 
 Improving access for small business to economic opportunities, with improved access to 
land, finance and support services. 
 Expanding the Special Employment Programmes to raise the level of job creation as quickly 
as possible.  Although these are short term employment generators, improved coordination 
with local planning, private sector promotion activities and human resource development 
programmes should enable the building of important community assets and of entry points to 
longer-term opportunities.   
 Pursuing a number of sectorally-focused initiatives where there could be quick but 
sustainable employment creation, as in services such as tourism, and in certain goods 
destined for the local market. 
 Improving the overall investment environment by reducing uncertainty caused by, for 
example, high crime rates, and by reducing the cost of doing business by, for example, 
improving the provision of commercial and public transport. 
 
To improve the employability of labour, emphasis will be placed on:  
 
 Improving the functioning of labour markets, with an emphasis on geographic and 
occupational mobility, greater adaptability to changing circumstances, a more appropriate 
regulatory framework, reduced occupational discrimination and improved absorption of new 
entrants. 
 Improving education and training levels, with an emphasis on better coordination in the 
responses of secondary and tertiary education to labour market needs, dramatic 
improvements in the provision of basic education, and the institutional transformation of the 
system of industrial skilling. 
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 Improving the delivery and cost-efficiency in social security systems and ensuring greater 
accessibility of social and infrastructure services. 
 Creating a more efficient, flexible and proactive public service will be essential to achieving 
this vision.  Enhancing the productivity of public expenditure will require improvements in 
the allocation of financial resources, in the deployment of public servants, in work 
organisation and in programme coordination. 
 
[www.polity.org.za] 
 
− Accelerated Growth and Development Strategy (ASGISA) [Accelerated and Shared Growth & 
Investment in South Africa?] 
Late 2005 witnessed government launching its Accelerated Growth and Development Strategy 
with the aim of boosting economic growth in order that levels of poverty and unemployment 
will decline at a greater pace that has been the case to date.  This Strategy also involves 
substantially increasing levels of public investment in the economic sphere through 
infrastructure, but also in terms of basic needs and service delivery.  Emphasis is placed in 
public pronouncements on the new approach, which seeks to attain 6% growth for the country 
by 2014, on ensuring that employment opportunities are maximised where possible.  In 2005 
South Africa’s economic growth approach 4% and for the first time in decades some net 
increases in employment over unemployment growth were seen. 
 
 
3.4 COMMENTARY 
 
The recent policy improvements to human settlements (and Breaking New Ground framework 
being perhaps the most visible of the policy improvements), combined with expanded levels of 
public and private investment, stronger economic growth and attention being paid to employment in 
all spheres of public sector activity, presents an opportunity for considerable innovation and scaling 
up of activities.  The Department of Housing (2005) estimated that, in 1997, every R1million 
invested in the housing sector generated 57 direct and 86 indirect temporary employment 
opportunities.  While these are not sustainable jobs, they do make an important short-term 
contribution.  It is estimated that the Government’s low-income housing programme generated 109 
445 direct and 164 168 indirect temporary employment opportunities in 1997, with an expenditure 
of almost R2 billion on the subsidy programme.  The cost of each employment opportunity has 
fallen by 15-20% since the inception of the programme and there have been incremental 
improvements in levels of attention being placed on employment issues and in the approaches 
adopted. 
 
Employment generation is now articulated as an objective in the policy frameworks both at a 
general urban development level and specifically in relation to shelter issues.  However, this has, in 
many cases not translated into effective actions as pressures at the implementation level often focus 
on outputs other than those related to employment.  Whilst the emergence of the EPWP has allowed 
for considerably greater attention to be paid to opportunities in the housing delivery pipeline, this 
has tended to focus on bulk-services as opposed to other elements of the delivery process.  
However, in reflecting on the role of the EPWP it is important to keep in mind criticisms made of 
the programme such as that by McCord (2004):  
 
“… the EPWP does not offer a significant response to the broader unemployment crisis currently 
being experienced by the state.  This point is underlined by the fact that in order to meet the MDG 
objective of halving unemployment in South Africa by 2014, approximately 3.6 – 7.7 million 
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additional jobs will be required (Meth 2004b), compared to the total of 200,000 temporary jobs to 
be provided at any one time under the EPWP.” 
 
[McCord, 2004: p 10] 
 
Nevertheless, despite concerns about effectiveness of programmes such as EPWP, there is evidence 
of a shift in government’s emphasis which suggests a greater recognition that urban development 
could be more holistic, create more jobs, and be more responsive to local conditions through greater 
flexibility in national policy frameworks.  The focus on employment issues in the past few years as 
well as a renewed government commitment to an urban development agenda has allowed for 
programmes such as the EPWP to begin to take root.  However, at the level of implementation there 
remains a measure of caution when it comes to local authorities allocating the time and resources to 
maximise employment opportunities.   This is aggravated by inertia in some national programmes, 
where funding models or regulatory procedures do not necessarily enable full opportunity to be 
taken of the funding opportunities. 
 
The recent national policy frameworks under the Breaking New Ground Plan place considerably 
greater emphasis than was previously the case on dealing with informal settlements.  Despite the 
vigourous housing investments over the past decade, there is need for continued focus on housing 
policy and programs, as the numbers of informal settlements and their populations have not only 
persisted but have increased since 1994..  In response, there has been in increase in the number of 
projects seeking to undertake in situ (or on-site) upgrades of informal settlements, and  there are 
many projects that seek to relocate people living in poorly located informal settlements into 
greenfields housing projects.  Cities such as eThekwini and Johannesburg have identified 
settlements for upgrading in situ or relocation.  Cape Town has responded through the large-scale 
urban redevelopment “N2 Gateway” project.  These form part of nine major pilots of combination 
in situ upgrades and relocations (to new housing schemes) under the Breaking New Ground 
commitments. 
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4.  Case studies 
 
The case studies give some insight into how housing can influence employment processes at the 
project level.  The first case, Cato Manor in Durban, was the subject of an urban development 
project co-funded by the government and the European Union.  The second case is that of the 
People’s Housing Process in a small-scale housing project in Vosloorus, Ekurhuleni (near 
Johannesburg).   
 
 
4.1 CATO MANOR 
 
Cato Manor has been held up as a model of international best practice in urban reconstruction.  It 
also provides a useful understanding of the difficulty in using housing to create employment in a 
complex institutional environment.   
 
Cato Manor is a large area, approximately 1830 hectares, and is close to the Durban city centre, as 
Figure 3 shows.  Approximately half of Cato Manor is unsuitable for urban development due to 
flood zones, unsuitable geology or adverse topography.  By the early 1990s it was home to an 
estimated 93 000 people who had settled in the area through mass invasions.  Many of the people 
settling in Cato Manor during this period had fled political violence in areas on the metropolitan 
periphery.  Before this Cato Manor had been vacant since the 1950's, following apartheid forced 
removals of an estimated 150 000 people.   
 
Figure 6: Cato Manor in its Local Context  
 
 
 
[CMDA website, 2005] 
 
In the early 1990s - as the pace of political reform in South Africa grew - Cato Manor increasingly 
came to be seen as an opportunity for a “mega” urban renewal project and an opportunity to test 
new democratic approaches to urban reconstruction.  According to the CMDA, “[Diverse] groups of 
stakeholders including individuals, local community organisations, political parties and city and 
provincial authorities came together to embrace the numerous re-development challenges presented 
by Cato Manor”  
 
[CMDA website, 2005] 
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The redevelopment of Cato Manor has regional significance because of the impact it has had on 
restructuring Durban’s city form, as well as the impact it has had nationally as a learning area for 
the post-apartheid redevelopment of other inner city sites.  The combination of Cato Manor’s 
location and its historical significance presented a promising laboratory in which to test some of the 
ANC’s approaches in terms of urban reconstruction in general, and its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) in particular. 
 
South African housing policy stresses the need for the establishment of viable, socially and 
economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic 
opportunities as well as to health, educational and social amenities.  The primary purpose of the 
Cato Manor Development Programme (CMDP) was to create a vibrant, high density, economically 
sustainable and ecologically balanced urban environment that was fully integrated into the 
surrounding urban fabric physically, institutionally, socially and economically.  The Cato Manor 
Development Association (CMDA) was established to plan and facilitate the redevelopment of Cato 
Manor.  The planning function included the preparation of projects and out-sourcing their 
implementation.  The CMDP is a complex and holistic urban redevelopment project with a housing 
component, rather than a housing project with an urban redevelopment component.  As the focus of 
this report is on employment, some of the nuances of the overall project are not described here.   
 
Historical context 
Figure 7 A brief history of Cato Manor 
 
 
 
1845 Farmed by Durban’s first mayor George Cato and subdivided into smaller farms at the turn of the century. 
1900-
1930 
Land hired and sold to Indian market gardeners.  First settlement of Africans on the banks of the 
Umkhumbane River 
1932 Cato Manor incorporated in to Durban Municipality.  Shack settlements declared illegal.  Shack farming by 
Indian landowners. 
1949 Violence between Indians and Africans resulted in most Indians families leaving the area. 
1950 Indian landlords returned to Cato Manor, where 50000 people then lived 
1957 Cato Manor declared a temporary transit camp.  ”Townships” constructed on the periphery of the 
municipality and residents of Cato Manor forcibly removed to new housing in KwaMashu and Phoenix. 
1959-
1960 
Resistance to attempts to forcibly remove people to KwaMashu culminated in the death of nine police in the 
transit camp.  The authorities escalate the removals and rapidly cleared the entire area. 
1968 With the exception of a few scattered houses, shops, the beer hall and several Hindu temples, all of the 
building stock and infrastructure were demolished. 
1979 Remaining residents form the Cato Manor Residents Association 
Mid-
1980s 
House of Delegates – the administration set up under apartheid to deal with “Indian affairs - identifies land 
at Wiggins for housing for the Indian population. 
1992 Cato Manor Development Forum established to pool the land and to commit stakeholders to the 
redevelopment of Cato Manor. 
1993  Cato Manor Development Association established as a non profit organisation to manage the redevelopment 
of Cato Manor.  Two neighbourhoods in Cato manor, Cato Crest and Wiggins were invaded in the run-up to 
the first democratic elections.   
1995 Cato Manor designated a special presidential project.  Further land invasions occurred.  Cato Manor 
structure plan was drafted, based on the notion of the compact city, and structured by mixed use intensive 
activity corridors. 
1996 EU signed co-financing agreement.  The process of inviting and hearing land claims started. 
1997 Land claim settlement reached. 
1996-
1998 
Project is restructured with greater accountability to the municipality. 
2002 Initial EU programme ended.  The project is restructured as an Area-Based Management programme. 
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Institutional Context 
The predecessor of the CMDA, the Greater Cato Manor Development Forum, was influential in 
determining the structure of the CMDA, and the development philosophy for the redevelopment of 
Cato Manor. 
 
The CMDA was established in 1993 as a not-for-profit company, to act as an agent for the 
eThekwini Municipality (then known as the Durban City Council), the Kwa-Zulu-Natal provincial 
government (then known as the Natal Provincial Administration) and national government.  It was 
politically important that CMDA be separate from any single state organ (Nell et al, 2003).   
 
 The development vision for Cato Manor envisaged “a vibrant, high density, balanced, sustainable 
urban environment appropriately integrated into the surrounding areas, offering a mixture of 
residential, economic, social and community opportunities, targeted mainly at the urban poor, and 
easily accessible without the need to own a car.” 
 
[CMDA website] 
 
Furthermore the vision had to be attained in a manner that was “innovative, replicable, 
environmentally sound, non-discriminatory, had a positive influence on the development of the 
eThekwini Metropolitan Area and will generate models for future urban development projects.”  
 
 [CMDA website] 
 
The intended expression of this vision was the provision of affordable housing and secure tenure; 
the development of bulk engineering and social infrastructure, the improvement of access; the 
establishment of safe and secure living and working environments; the provision of jobs and 
extensive economic opportunities; and the integration of Cato Manor into the eThekwini 
Municipality.  The CMDA targeted the delivery of 25 000 dwelling units and the creation of 25 000 
permanent jobs. 
 
The roles which CMDA intended to serve to achieve the vision were: 
 
− To be the facilitator of development in Cato Manor 
− To ensure that development took place in an integrated manner 
− To identify and prepare projects for implementation by public, private and community agencies.   
− To act as a developer of ‘last resort’. 
 
The scale of the project required a commitment of R 514 million.  Funders included the South 
African Government, the EU, the Provincial Housing Department, the eThekwini Municipality.  
Unites States Agency for International Development and the Swedish International Development 
Agency, the Independent Development Trust and the Development Bank of Southern Africa who 
supported earlier phases of the project. 
 
A partnership approach was identified as a key success factor.  As a result, relationships with 
funders grew beyond conventional funder-recipient relationship.  Strong ties were also established 
with a range of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs) and Development Committees as well as with universities and technikons.  Where possible 
these institutions were encouraged to play a role in implementation.  The delivery of essential 
services in Cato Manor has proceeded through joint partnerships with local, provincial and national 
government departments such as police, welfare, housing, education and health.   
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One of the key features of the project’s funding was the EU’s condition that there be co-financing 
from other funders.  In particular commitments were required from the Department of Housing’s 
subsidy scheme, and from local government to take operational responsibility for social facilities 
and engineering infrastructure.  Lack of contracted commitments in either of these two cases would 
jeopardise the EU funds 
 
The EU funding contract ended at the end of 2003.  CMDA was then incorporated into the 
eThekwini Metro.  CMDA is now one of several geographically discrete programmes of targeted, 
integrated development interventions referred to as the Area Based Management Programmes.  The 
inspiration for this the Area Based Management Programmes was Cato Manor.  The Area Based 
Management Programmes are co-funded by the EU.  The Cato Manor Area Based Management 
took over many of the CMDA’s roles and functions, guided in part by the independent Final 
Evaluation of the CMDP. 
 
 
The Evolution of the CMDP 
The overall development process in Cato Manor was envisaged as comprising three broad 
overlapping stages.   
 
− Phase I: Project Preparation - Securing the fundamentals for development (1994-1997) 
The aim of this initial three-year phase was to position the CMDP for intensive delivery and 
implementation.  Conditions for creating an environment conducive to large-scale delivery were 
incrementally put in place during this time:  
 
 Development plans and policies were put in place, in particular spatial plan comprising two 
activity corridors, a central node and a range of residential precincts.; 
 Technical and social support requirements were identified and secured; 
 Land assembly (including the consolidation of title) took place; 
 Statutory and legal constraints to development were cleared; 
 Land invasions were successfully halted;  
 The maintenance of law and order was improved; and 
 Commitments of major public investment were secured and directed into projects. 
 
In addition, sound working relations amongst key partners were established, roles clarified, and 
human resources recruited to drive the development initiatives forward.   
 
A major challenge was to deal with the claims for land restitution of land made by people and 
communities who had been forcibly removed.  Over 5 700 of such land claims were tabled to the 
Land Claims Commission.  The volume of land claims threatened to bring the broader 
development process to a complete halt.  Te CMDP successfully petitioned the Land Claims 
Court to not restore land to claimants but to use other forms of redress such as alternative land or 
financial compensation.   
 
− Phase II: Delivery at scale (1997-2002) 
Large-scale delivery began in 1997 and the massive public investment in the area became 
evident in the rapid transformation of Cato Manor’s physical landscape.  Significant progress 
with was made to eliminate backlogs in housing, and engineering and social infrastructure.   
A Mid-Term Review was undertaken in 2000 by independent consultants.  The review that the 
CMDP had been highly successful in meeting its initial objectives.   
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− Phase III: Private investment and capital formation (2002 and beyond) 
The third phase of the CMDP focussed on:  
 
 Social development 
 Local economic development 
 Escalation of private sector investment 
 Completion of the housing programme 
 Assessing the replicability of CMDP. 
 
A Research and Documentation Project was started in March 2002 to assess the replicability of 
the CMDP and to disseminate the CMDP experiences in dealing with urban development 
problems, managing complex, large-scale development projects, and maintaining progress 
within the continuously shifting political and institutional environment. 
 
 
Bulk infrastructure program 
This program aimed to develop the larger-order infrastructure that would be required before the 
local infrastructure required for precincts could be constructed.  The bulk infrastructure components 
include main roads, bulk sewers, bulk water supply, electricity, and bulk stormwater disposal.  
Wherever possible, maximum use was made of the little bulk infrastructure that had escaped 
demolition.  Much of the bulk infrastructure was constructed by labour-based methods.   
 
A design principle of the main roads was that they had to provide high levels of mobility and 
accessibility within Cato Manor and to connect Cato Manor to the metropolitan area.  The new main 
roads - approximately 25 km of arterial, bus, and mini-bus routes - serve as a quick route from one 
side of the city to the other.   
 
 
Housing and related (local) infrastructure 
− Aims of the housing program 
 
Within the integrated urban reconstruction concept, it was intended that the housing programme 
would provide a range of housing types, be affordable, achieve economies of scale, and create a 
liveable environment.  Housing delivery was intended to stimulate economic multipliers, 
particularly job creation and economic development.  In the South African context, housing 
encompasses the construction of houses as well as the installation of local roads, sanitation, and 
water supply systems.  As with bulk infrastructure, housing (and related infrastructure) 
programme had potential for employment creations 
 
The Cato Manor housing programme targeted the delivery of 25 000 housing units to 
accommodate up to 150 000 people.  The housing program tried provide shelter and related 
infrastructure, as well as to address some of the pressing social and economic needs of the 
populace by:   
 
 Maximising the housing opportunities on the available land;  
 Providing a range of housing types;  
 Ensuring that the housing stock be affordable to low and middle income earners; and  
 Avoiding the creation of monotonous and unsustainable residential environments.   
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The supply of electricity and water reticulation to dwellings and the provision of a water-borne 
sewage is integral to the housing programme in Cato Manor.  The budget constraints of the 
subsidy system did not allow for the high standards of local infrastructure.  Top-up funding to 
improve the standards of local infrastructure was provided by the municipality.   
 
It was anticipated that the houses would be constructed by the private, not-for-profit, and 
community sectors, and that CMDA would only act as developer of last resort.  The gradual 
withdrawal of large, private sector companies from the low-income housing sector in the late 
1990s forced the CMDA to take on a more direct role.  The withdrawal of the private sector 
does not appear to have been formally analysed.  Anecdotal evidence suggest that the 
withdrawal arose from the declining profitability of subsidy-funded housing projects (prompted 
by failure of the housing subsidy quantum to match construction-linked inflation, sluggish 
release of progress payments, and the risks associated with subsidy-funded housing projects), 
and the opening up of other opportunities for the private sector. 
 
− Results and methods of the housing program 
 
Four broad housing project types were undertaken6:  
 
 Informal Settlement Upgrading Projects;  
 Greenfields Incremental Projects;  
 Social Housing; and  
 Credit-Linked Housing.   
 
There are six informal settlements in Cato Manor, housing approximately 7 500 households.  
Most of these settlements reach residential densities of over 90 shacks per hectare and many are 
situated on unstable land.  Many shacks house multiple households.  The CMDA focused much 
of its housing capacity on these settlements.   
 
Three of the settlements have been substantially upgraded, by the construction of local access 
roads and footpaths, local water supply and sanitation, and the construction of houses.  For the 
most part, local infrastructure was planned to minimise the need to relocate households.  Where 
it was unavoidable, households in the path of infrastructure were relocated to nearby 
greenfields projects.  Choices on house type were discussed with small groups of 50 to 100 
households at a time, and upgrading took place on a 'block by block' basis.   
 
Several housing and related infrastructure projects were developed on vacant land (so-called 
“Greenfields projects”).  The approach taken was to develop the projects within the available 
subsidy budget.  The rationale of this was that households could access shelter without any 
burden of debt, and that home-owners would extend or improve the houses when they could 
afford it.  This “incremental housing” approach appears to have succeeded.  Some of the older 
greenfields projects show high levels of consolidation, with almost every house having been 
extended.  The result of extensions has been augmented population density (a benefit at city-
scale) and rental income through the letting of part of the house (a benefit for home-owners).   
 
                                                 
6
 Appendix 1 contains a summary of the number of housing units delivered by the CMDP. 
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A pilot social housing project consisting of 320 units, the Shayamoya Project, was undertaken 
to test community responses to rental tenure and to multi-storey, higher density 
accommodation.  This model offers limited scope for the very poor to access housing.   
 
Credit-linked housing is aimed at families who can afford loan finance.  Three such projects 
were developed.  In order to make houses affordable to lower income households that would 
otherwise be unable to access bond housing CMDA designed loan packages, secured bulk 
finance, and took on the role of loan originator. 
 
− Challenges for the housing program 
The highly charged social and political environment in Cato Manor had a direct impact on the 
CMDA's ability to proceed with housing programmes.  Delivery was also hampered by the 
emergence of powerful “shack lords” who had an economic interest in maintaining the status 
quo in informal areas.   
 
An exodus of skilled professionals from KwaZulu-Nasal’s low-income housing industry - 
because of the high risks and relatively low returns of low-cost housing - led to the CMDA 
developing its own housing design and delivery capacity.  It did so by establishing and 
mentoring a network of local emerging contractors to build houses and related infrastructure.   
 
The difficult topography and complex geo-technical conditions that prevail across much of the 
development area have further challenges.   
 
Implicit in the holistic development approach was to avoid Cato Manor becoming a dormitory 
suburb.  The CMDP has demonstrated that it is possible to transform housing projects into 
liveable environments, and that after the construction of the initial house, households make 
substantial investments of own resources into improvements.  The involvement of communities 
from the outset seems to lead to home-owners identifying strongly with the process of housing 
and the products of housing.   
 
− Challenges to employment-intensive approaches 
Conditions of funding contracts did not in many cases specifically require employment intensive 
methods in housing construction.  Political pressure for rapid delivery may also have had a role 
in lessening focus on employment-intensity. 
 
In the first years of the housing subsidy scheme (ca. 1994 to 1999), no provision was made for 
increasing the subsidies to account for inflation.  Annual increases to the subsidy began in ca.  
2000.  For the first few years thereafter (up to ca.  2003), the annual increases were relatively 
small (though since then annual increases have exceeded inflation quite considerably).  Some of 
the effects of no- or low-increases from 1994 to 2003 seem to have been to: 
 
 Make it undesirable for project planners and implementers to do anything that would 
postpone the end-date of projects (like using slower labour-based methods, or deep 
community consultation) 
 Limit or exclude the scope for value-adds (like technical skills training, or encouraging the 
creation of construction SMEs) 
 Cut margins to the extent that established private sector firms were no longer prepared to 
consider employment-intensive or sub-contracting protocols. 
 Cut margins to the extent that most established private sector firms and consultants sought 
projects in other fields altogether.   
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Despite these constraints, CMDA was able to achieve results in employment creation and skills 
training. 
 
 
Social Infrastructure 
A full range of social facilities, (including schools, libraries, clinics, community halls, religious 
sites, urban parks and sports fields), was planned and built.  The facilities are located optimally in 
relation to housing projects, transport routes, and economic opportunities.  The development of 
social facilities was a major focus when large-scale delivery got underway in 1997. 
 
 
Employment  
− Context 
Employment levels in Cato Manor are relatively high, probably as a result of its close proximity 
to the inner city, the harbour and the South Durban Industrial Basin.  According to the 1996 
census (augmented by surveys undertaken by the CMDA), the total level of unemployment 
among the economically active population in Cato Manor was 29%.  Among men this rate was 
slightly lower at 26% and among women slightly higher at 32%. 
 
By economic sector, the main source of income was retail (65% of employment) followed by 
services (18% of employment).  Construction does not appear to make a significant contribution 
to employment in Cato Manor.  Proposals for a new and used building materials market may 
however change this.   
 
− Skills Development 
The CMDA implemented training programmes to help local people access economic 
opportunities, to gain employment, and to start businesses.  Initiatives to strengthen existing 
community organisations and to train people in basic life skills for urban living also form part of 
this programme. 
 
The Basic Business Management training project assisted emerging entrepreneurs to establish, 
operate and manage their business.  It benefited 230 small business owners.  Courses utilised 
material developed by the ILO, marketing and management training, and an analysis of each 
entrepreneur’s business.  The training was later extended to entrepreneurs in the Bellair Market, 
the Bellair Centre, economic hives and container parks.   
 
The Multi-Skilling programme, aimed at equipping emerging building contractors with 
technical, business and sub-contracting skills benefited 187 people.  Emerging contractors were 
linked to construction projects through appointment as labour-only sub-contractors, or as joint 
venture partners.   
 
The Home Ownership Education Project was designed to help first-time homeowners deal with 
the challenges of home ownership, and covered issues such as rates, services, maintenance and 
home extensions.  It attempted to raise community awareness around environmental, consumer 
and gender issues, as well as covering the challenges of human settlement development.  The 
Seliyabuya Co-operative, a team of trainers sourced from Cato Manor residents implemented the 
project.  The awareness project reached 4 500 household heads.  
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− Market linkages 
Employment creation is a part of the Cato Manor vision7.  The CMDA recognised the 
opportunity to provide both housing and jobs.  Local labour was recruited where feasible and 
where political pressure for rapid delivery allowed. 
 
CMDA fostered linkages between local residents and both local and non-local markets.  An 
initiative to establish savings clubs and co-operatives arose out of the Home Ownership 
Education Project.  Existing savings clubs were drawn into this poverty alleviation initiative and 
new clubs established.  Clubs were assisted with organisational development, management and 
operation.  Fifty savings clubs (also called ‘pre-co-operatives’) and five co-operatives (legal 
entities that operate as businesses) now pursue different ventures, including locally produced 
household detergents, fresh garden produce, cleaning, recycling, crafts and block making.   
 
The Job Opportunities Bureau database held details of 5,000 local small contractors and 
individuals seeking employment.  1,347 placements were made from this database both within 
Cato Manor and further a field.   
 
Spin-offs of social and infrastructure projects in Cato Manor included the employment of local 
residents and local enterprises.  Targeted procurement policies, developed by the South African 
government were implemented by the CMDA together with the Labour Forum, a sub-structure 
of the Cato Manor Community Organisation.  In their bids, contractors had to indicate the local 
content percentage of the project value (i.e. what value would accrue to local residents and local 
enterprises).  The CMDA and the Labour Forum together monitored the observance by non-local 
contractors of the local content conditions. 
 
The development of housing in Cato Manor had to strike a balance between rapid delivery and 
maximising the use of local based labour.  It was found that labour intensive approaches were 
most effective when the concept was introduced in the project preparation stage.  Local labour 
and expertise was used extensively for the construction of local infrastructure, for the 
construction of top structures, and has been used in ongoing maintenance and enhancement 
activities.  The labour components of each contract were broken down into tasks and allocated to 
labour teams.  Remuneration was based on the successful completion of tasks. 
 
The construction of bulk and local infrastructure were ideal opportunities for job creation.  
Initially, the municipality’s tender process was used as a basis for contracts, and clauses were 
included in contracts with respect to the sourcing of local labour for unskilled and semi-skilled 
activities.  One of these clauses required that at least 80% of the labour used for the project be 
drawn from the local area.  A further clause required the contractor to engage a community 
liaison officer whose responsibilities included identifying skills in the local community.   
 
The local labour requirements in the infrastructure contracts included a gender component, 
although the contractor and the local community often initially resisted this.  Nonetheless, once 
this resistance was overcome, teams of women were found to be more efficient in completing the 
tasks allocated to them than all male teams.  Use of local labour was monitored by means of 
reporting on site minutes. 
 
                                                 
7
 “Policy Framework for Cato Manor”, ca.  1995 
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The CMDA was also able to increase the impact of the use of labour intensive techniques by 
requiring a minimum wage slightly higher than the legal requirement.  A typical contract for 
local infrastructure resulted in the servicing of 250 to 500 sites over 4 to 8 months.  Although the 
employment created was temporary in nature, sufficient skills development took place to make it 
possible for future employment opportunities to be taken up by those who had been trained. 
 
The construction of top structures requires a more skilled labour force than the construction of 
infrastructure.  Initially local contractors were subcontracted through large construction 
companies who held the main contract with the Department of Housing.  In many cases, the 
local sub-contractors operated as little more than labour brokers.   
 
As mentioned previously, between 1998 and 2000, many of the larger construction companies 
pulled out of the low-income housing sector, citing diminishing returns and increasing risk.  As a 
result the CMDA increasingly played the developer role on housing projects.  Groups of local 
artisans who were unable to find work began to present themselves as contractors.  These groups 
consisted of people with all the necessary skills to construct a house (electrician, plumber, 
bricklayer, roofer etc) with one artisan taking the lead role and the responsibility for delivery of 
the house.  This lead person was usually selected on their ability to understand and manage the 
contract.   
 
Initially a contractor would be given one house to construct.  If this was completed satisfactorily 
then they would be given a contract for the construction of two houses.  On successful 
completion of this contract, a contract for the construction of five houses was then awarded.  
Approximately 30 groups were initially given contracts, and through a process of performance-
based selection, this number was reduced.   
 
Successful local contractors were used on other housing projects throughout Cato Manor.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same contractors are now being used by residents to 
improve and extend their properties.  As residents discovered the market for sub-letting rooms, 
the initial structures have been systematically expanded.  It is estimated that 60% of households 
extended their structure within two years of occupation. 
 
While it was recognised that capacity building and the use of local resources was important, 
delivery pressure and EU procurement rules precluding affirmative appointments meant that 
resources external to Cato Manor had to be used.  However, the approach taken was to require 
external consultants and contractors to build the capacity of local residents and local businesses.   
 
In 1993/1994 a Consultants Appointment Review Panel (CARP) was set up to deal with 
selection of consultants as well as broader issues of transformation in particular the following 
objectives: 
 
 Transformation of the allocation of job opportunities to achieve an equitable balance of race, 
gender and other groups or organisations historically excluded from the development 
process. 
 Expanding the pool of competent black consultants, technicians and entrepreneurs as well as 
building local expertise in urban development. 
 Re-training professionals, particularly in the public sector. 
 Engendering a wider civic accountability. 
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LED was not implemented as a line function but was integrated into other programmes.  This 
created problems when the Cato Manor Area Based Management took over, in that LED had no 
natural “home” within municipal structures.  Specific construction-related projects include the 
uMkumbane Block Making Co-operative and the building material manufacture project. 
 
− Results of employment programmes 
8 759 temporary jobs were created by the programmes run under the CMDP.  1% of these jobs 
became permanent, and all of these were created by the LED programme (which also generated 
the most number of temporary employment opportunities).  The housing programme resulted in 
2,610 temporary jobs.   
 
The skills development component of the Housing and Social Facilities programme was 
particularly successful with 100% of temporary employees receiving some level of skills 
transfer.   
 
Figure 8 Skills Development and temporary employment in the CMDP 
 
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were given 
temporary employment 
 Activity 
No. % of resident pop. No. % of resident pop. 
LED 2973 3.2% 3644 3.9% 
Housing 2610 2.8% 2610 2.8% 
Infrastructure 0 0.0% 1136 1.2% 
Social Facilities 1369 1.5% 1369 1.5% 
Total 6952 7.5% 8759 9.4% 
 
 
Figure 9 Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Cato Manor 
Assessment 
factor 
Infrastructure Top-structures Post-completion 
Use of 
technology 
Machinery and labour 
intensive methods  both 
used 
Appropriate choice of 
labour intensive 
technologies 
Appropriate choice of 
labour intensive 
technologies for 
infrastructure 
maintenance, and home 
improvements 
Procurement of 
unskilled and 
semi-skilled 
labour 
80% local labour 
Community liaison officers 
recruited from communities 
On site training and skills 
transfer 
Sourced locally 
Indications are that local 
people have been 
procured for home 
improvements. 
Procurement of 
artisans, 
supervisors and 
professionals 
From outside the area 
Artisans sourced locally. 
Mentors to emerging 
contractors sourced from 
outside. 
Indications are that the 
more efficient of the 
emerging contractors 
are being engaged by 
have been procured for 
home improvements. 
Materials 
procurement 
Mostly from outside the 
area 
Mostly from outside the 
area 
Mostly from outside the 
area  (presumed) 
Equipment 
procurement From outside the area From outside the area 
From outside the area 
(presumed) 
Skills 
development  
Some basic skills 
transferred 
Emerging contractors 
trained and mentored No information. 
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Assessment 
factor 
Infrastructure Top-structures Post-completion 
Investments  of 
resources by 
project 
beneficiaries 
.Extremely unlikely that 
private households would 
have invested into public 
projects 
Unlikely to have occurred 
because of the formality of 
the contractor-led delivery 
model 
Significant investments 
by home-owners in  
home extensions and 
improvements 
Involvement of 
women 
Part of the 80% local labour 
requirement.  Usually 
strongly resisted by 
contractors. 
Part of the 80% local labour 
requirement.  Usually 
strongly resisted by 
contractors. 
No information 
Working 
conditions 
Minimum wage set higher 
than legislative 
requirements.  Complied 
with minimum health and 
safety requirements as set 
out in legislation 
Minimum wage set higher 
than legislative 
requirements.  Complied 
with minimum health and 
safety requirements as set 
out in legislation 
Home extensions 
unlikely to follow 
legislated guidelines 
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Commentary on employment aspects in Cato Manor 
The following conclusions reflect a project, which despite some shortcomings has, had impact in 
terms of scale and scope: 
 
− The change from an agency representing all three spheres of government to an implementing 
agent located within the municipality presented an opportunity to make use of more 
employment intensive methods, particularly in light of the fact that the housing programme 
is far from complete.   
 
− The shift in emphasis from infrastructure, housing and public buildings to economic, human 
and social development provided further opportunities for job creation.   
 
− Labour-based construction was often viewed as a “nice-to-have” when balanced against the 
political pressures to deliver housing and infrastructure projects.  This limited the extent to 
which these approaches could be mainstreamed into the overall programme.  Where it was 
possible, CMDA used labour intensive approaches and made significant impacts. 
 
− The main performance indicators of the housing projects were the quality of the house and 
the number of houses built.  Job creation was not a key performance indicator.  
 
− LED in Cato Manor focussed on extending credit, and availing information and marketing 
assistance and enterprise development activities.  There potential alignment between LED 
interventions and housing-related processes was not always exploited. 
 
− While it has been suggested that better value for money may have been achieved through 
greater use of aided self-help approach, particularly where such a large proportion of 
residents are unemployed, the choice of delivery system was also largely determined by 
community attitudes: “It appears that residents, despite being given access to training, 
materials and other support, were not in favour of this [owner-builder] approach and chose 
to employ a building contractor” (Boaden, 2004, pg 239). Hence a considerable focus of 
support work by the CMDA was focused on contractor development. 
 
− That the creation of permanent employment remains a major challenge as is highlighted by 
the absence of permanent employment created by the Housing, Infrastructure and Social 
Facilities Programs. 
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4.2. VOSLOORUS PEOPLE’S HOUSING PROCESS PROJECT 
 
This case study examines a housing project in Vosloorus that was implemented via the People’s 
Housing Process (PHP).  Vosloorus lies to the east of Johannesburg in the Ekurhuleni Metro,  
Gauteng province.  The study contextualises the PHP and then describes the specific experience in 
the Vosloorus case, as perceived by one of the development agencies involved in the project, 
Planact, an NGO.  A limitation of this case study is that another development agency that had a 
significant involvement in the project, namely the Ekurhuleni Metro – the local authority, was not 
extensively consulted in the course of the study of the Vosloorus case. 
 
The policy context for the Peoples Housing Process (PHP) 
A summarised version of this section appears in 3.1. Urban development & housing. 
 
The establishment of partnerships, the transfer of skills, community empowerment and a process 
that is people-driven were some of the key principles underlying this policy.  The policy was 
introduced in 1998. 
 
The PHP “aims to support households who wish to enhance their subsidies by building or 
organising the building of their homes themselves. The process assists such households to access:   
− “Housing subsidies   
− “Technical, financial, logistical and administrative support regarding the building of their 
homes, on a basis that is sustainable and affordable. Experience has proved that if beneficiaries 
are given the chance either to build houses themselves or to organise the building of houses 
themselves, they can build better houses for less money.  
 
“The People’s Housing Process route towards accessing subsidies provides a creative alternative to 
the mechanisms described in the previous chapters because beneficiaries can:   
− “save on labour costs by doing some of the building work themselves or by getting their 
neighbours, friends and families or other persons to help them;   
− “avoid having to pay a profit element to developers if they build houses themselves or organise 
for those houses to be built;   
− “optimise their decisions by using opportunities for trade offs.   
 
“Technical assistance and support in this process is, however, critical.  Consequently, a crucial 
imperative of the People’s Housing Process approach is the requirement to establish a Support 
Organisation. This organisation spearheads the technical support process”  as well as the financial 
and project management processes. 
 
[Housing Code Part 3 Chapter 8: Housing Subsidy Scheme / People’s Housing Process] 
  
Implementation guidelines for the PHP process were published by the National Department of 
Housing in May 1998, more or less concurrently with the introduction of the policy. 
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PHP funding 
The PHP is a delivery mechanism (as opposed to a type of subsidy).  With some minor 
modifications, it utilises the same housing subsidy types (Greenfields, Consolidation, Institutional et 
al) that are available for delivery of housing stock via more conventional mechanisms.  There is 
provision for additional funding at R 800 per beneficiary for organisational, technical and 
administrative support. This is channelled via Support Organisations under the funding instrument 
“Establishment Grant”. 
 
Delivery of housing stock nationally via PHP 
Statistics on delivery (houses built or under construction) via the PHP mechanism could not be 
readily located during the research period.  An alternative indicator of scale of the use of the PHP 
mechanism is the number of subsidy approvals.  By March 2004, subsidies approved for delivery 
via PHP totalled 272 165 (since the inception of the PHP mechanism in 1998).  This represented 
11.17% of all of the 2 436 404 housing subsidies approved from 1994 to 2004.   
 
It is presently unclear if the proportion of subsidies to be delivered via PHP will remain at the 
present 11% level.  There does not appear to be an express strategy at a national level as the relative 
emphasis to be placed on the PHP mechanism.  The implication appears to be that the various 
Provincial Housing Departments and-or municipalities will individually set their own particular 
approach as to the relative weight on PHP compared to other delivery mechanisms.  Systematic 
research was not however undertaken to determine each province’s or selected municipalities’ PHP 
intentions.   
 
One means of expression of emphasis on PHP is the use of target quotas.  The Gauteng and North-
West Provincial Departments of Housing (and there may be others) have expressed their intentions 
to set aside a percentage of their total number of subsidies for delivery via PHP.   While other 
provinces have not necessarily set target quotas, this would not necessarily imply a lack of emphasis 
on PHP delivery.   
 
Institutional support nationally 
The Peoples Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT) was established in June 1997.  It was mandated to 
drive the implementation of a comprehensive capacity building programme in support of the PHP 
delivery mechanism. The authors of this report surmise that, to some extent the existence of the 
PHPT may have assisted in making the PHP process more visible.  The presence of the PHP is also 
likely to have been a factor in the number of subsidies applied for via the PHP mechanism.  It 
appears likely that the shrinkage of the PHPT’s staff complement to three persons during the 2004 
fiscal year8 will result in diminished visibility of the PHP mechanism, and may therefore also affect 
the number of subsidy applications made under the PHP mechanism. 
 
Institutional support in Gauteng 
The Gauteng Department of Housing has prioritised PHP housing projects as a delivery strategy to 
the extent that they have established a PHP directorate.  This directorate has set targets to establish 
60 housing support centres and construct 60 000 houses in three years.  The province appears to be 
advocating a PHP model in which construction ‘brigades’ are established to undertake the 
construction of the houses using labour from the subsidy beneficiary community.  Furthermore the 
province has insisted that the houses be a minimum of 36m² in size and that they should have at 
least two bedrooms. 
                                                 
8
 NDOH Annual report March 2004 
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The Gauteng Province had also initially decided to implement PHP by uniformly designating the 
local authority as the Support Organisation.  The province is now trying to source other support 
organisations, and to create a new institution to capacitate local authorities.  It was on this basis that 
the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council brought in Planact as the Secondary Support Organisation in 
the Vosloorus project. 
 
Project pre-history 
Vosloorus Ext 28 is an informal settlement with 1 350 serviced sites and is about 25km from the 
CBD of Boksburg.  The project was initiated in 1987 when South African National Civics 
Organisation assisted the community to identify land.  Land was obtained and in 1990 infrastructure 
was installed through the Independent Development Trust’s Capital Subsidy Scheme.  Since then, 
lighting, tarred roads and facilities such as clinics were incrementally constructed in the area.  Over 
time a strong community social network has developed through Block and Area committees, and 
more recently Ward committees.   
 
Identities of the Support Organisation, the Account Administrator, and the Secondary 
Support Organisation 
The Ekurhuleni Metro was the Support Organisation, and the Account Administrator, and its 
responsibilities were to assume overall contractual responsibility for the project implementation and 
to administer project finances.  In mid-2000 the Ekurhuleni Metro appointed Planact as the 
Secondary Support Organisation, in order to partner the Support Organisation and the Vosloorus 
community in the implementation of the project.  Planact is an NGO that since the 1980s has been 
involved in community-centred development, and a critical skill it brought to the project was the 
ability to serve as an interface between community and project. 
 
The following progress was identified since the formation of the Metro-Planact partnership: 
 
− The Steering/Housing Committee established its legitimacy within the community and 
undertook a needs assessment to determine the community’s priorities; 
 
− Newly elected Steering/Housing committee members were trained in leadership; finance; 
project management, and; the roles of all actors in the process; 
 
− Community mobilisation workshops were conducted; 
 
− The local municipality strengthened its support to the project; 
 
− Proposals were prepared and then presented to secure the Gauteng Province’s commitment of 
Housing Subsidies, Facilitation Grants and Establishment Grants.  This  took approximately 8 
months at a cost of approximately R 50 000 to Planact, of which R 36 000.00 was recovered 
from the Facilitation Grant  The value of Housing Subsidies awarded to the project  in 2001 was 
R 2 125 000 (at R 8 500.00 per top structure); 
 
− Project Beneficiaries were identified, and Subsidy Forms (i.e. individual applications) prepared 
and presented.  A first batch of 300 subsidy applications were submitted by June 2002, and the 
250 of these were approved by province in September 2002; 
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− The coordination of the project team was improved.  The project team consisted of the 
Vosloorus Steering Committee (VSC) made up of 11 members, Planact 2 members, and 
Ekurhuleni Metro (2 officials) and the Gauteng Department of Housing officials (2 officials).  
The project team was convened in July 2002.  The VSC met weekly with Planact prior to the 
project team meetings to deal with internal issues, ongoing capacity-building and to prepare for 
the project team meetings.   
 
− Management agreements were signed whereby the Council, as account administrator, provided 
R 50 000.00 as working capital so that Planact could pay emerging contractors and itself receive 
a materials handling fee.  The Council and province provided all the technical professional 
assistance free of charge, in the persons of a planner, engineer and building inspector; 
 
− Capacity was enhanced for the construction process.  Firstly a capacity assessment of the 
community was undertaken by Planact, and then a plan for skills development was made.  The 
project team decided that the beneficiaries or other local labourers should work in labour teams 
under the supervision of emerging contractors from the community.  Proposals were called for 
from local emerging contractors.  26 emerging contractors applied.  The candidate contractors 
were introduced to the community, and 16 candidates were short-listed.  After an assessment, 
using references and interviews, ten candidates were selected.  These ten undertook Recognition 
of Prior Learning tests, paid for by the Department of Labour.  All passed the tests and got 
certification.  Each of these contractors then had to employ ten labourers.  At Planact’s 
insistence the project team made a commitment that 30% of labourers be women.    Each team 
of ten labourers were made up of 4 artisans or semi-skilled labourers and six unskilled labourers.  
The 100 labourers were then offered building skills training in July 2002 at a cost of R 500 
000.00 donated by the Department of Labour, in the fields of carpentry, bricklaying, glazing, 
wiring, and painting.  The longest training duration was 45 days for the brick layers.  Ninety-
eight people completed the training. How much and when to pay for the labour costs was agreed 
between the project committee and the project labour-force.  This also allowed for the labour 
portion of the budget to be finalised and deadlines to be set; 
 
− The system for the payment of labour was developed. The labour budget for each completed 
house was R 2 434 (excluding project-level management costs).  This was broken down as 
follows: 
 
 R 540   Emerging Contractor / Construction Manager 
 R 560   Bricklayer  
 R 144   Unskilled labourers for foundation and slab 
 R 600   Unskilled  labourers for the walls and roof 
 R 250   Carpenter  
 R 300   Glazier 
 R 40    Draughtsperson 
 
− Due to the dolomitic conditions that occur on the site, special foundations had to be constructed 
in accordance with a design by a structural engineer.  Initially an emerging contractor was 
identified to construct the foundations, but had to pull out as he could not finance the 
construction up-front and the Council refused to provide bridging finance.  He was replaced by a 
more established contractor (who had been appointed via a separate process as the material 
supplier for the project).  Work on the foundations began in November 2002.  The foundations 
contractor was paid R 3 300.00 per 36m² foundation (including materials).  He  was 
contractually obliged to utilise local labour.  The contractor established four labour teams and 
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appointed 12 local labourers per team, to hand-mix the concrete.  He paid each labourer R 12 
per foundation.   
 
− The Council charged the project R 30 per house for the scrutiny and approval of house plans. 
− The system for the payment of management costs was developed.  The housing support centre  
employed 4 people: 1 technical person with building experience (a past lecturer at APEX and 
with building qualifications); 1 community liaison officer and 2 administrators.  Each of these 
were paid a fee per completed house.  The management costs paid out by Planact per completed 
houses was R 260, broken down as follows:  
 
 R 80 Technical Person 
 R 60 Community Liaison Officer 
 R 120 Administrators  
 
In addition to these direct management costs, the five Steering Committee members from the 
community were paid R20 per completed house. They were paid in clusters of 100 houses.  
Planact were paid a 5% materials handling fee of the material cost of each top-structure and 5% 
of each foundation.  All of these management costs plus equipment and other running costs 
were paid from the Establishment Grants. 
 
− Project beneficiaries were consulted on house options.  Choice was limited because of the local 
authority standards.  The VSC, in consultation with the community, decided on a basic square 
house.  Beneficiaries decided on where to position their homes on their own sites. 
 
− Procurement decisions were made together with the community.  Candidate material suppliers 
were identified, but only one was ultimately selected by the project team due to cost 
considerations.   
 
− The Housing Support Centre (HSC) was established in November 2002, when the Ekurhuleni 
Metro donated a building.  This permitted the bulk of the Establishment Grants (at R 570 per 
beneficiary) to be used for staffing and equipment.   
 
− Since the start of the project in 2001, some 530 beneficiaries have been trained in construction 
skills.  Some of those originally trained dropped out of the process due to other commitments or 
because they expected higher pay for the work. 
 
Phase I of house construction 
Construction of the first phase of 250 houses began in January 2003.  The HSC foreman decided 
which house contractor would work on which house and in what site-order the construction would 
take place.  The HSC foreman also liaised with beneficiaries on construction issues.  Planact and the 
HSC foreman together monitored building progress to ensure that standards were met.  A standard 
specification inspection form was filled in for each house to check quality of construction 
 
Building inspectors from the Ekurhuleni Metro and the Gauteng DoH inspected construction once 
the houses were completed, and where they were satisfied, they issued ‘fit to occupy’ certificates.  
 
The project team met weekly to monitor progress.  The 250 houses were completed by September 
2003.  After this  the contracts with the materials supplier / foundations contractor  were terminated 
due to poor performance on the supply of materials and the bad quality of the foundations. 
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Building materials used in Phase one included: 
− Bricks, building sand and cement 
− Steel window and door frames 
− Steel doors and locks 
− Concrete lintels, concrete window sills (exterior), and concrete air bricks 
− Corrugated iron and SA pine rafters 
 
Phase II of house construction 
Phase II comprised another 250 units.  Construction began in October 2003 and was completed by 
about May 2005, a 19-month period – roughly twice as long as the construction period for Phase I.  
Planact cited two main causes for this: 
− Difficulties in procuring  reliable material suppliers 
− Delays by the province in processing the subsidy application forms.   
 
Eight materials suppliers were tried over a period of a year before a reliable one was found.  The 
seven materials suppliers who fell out all complained about the small profit margins.  
 
A new foundations contractor was appointed, Instead of hand-mixed concrete, pre-mix concrete was 
used in the foundations.  This reduced the four foundation labour teams from 12 to six workers 
each.   
 
 To enable them to oversee the building process, technical workshops were held with 20 
beneficiaries at a time to train them on basic building aspects such as mortar mixes, bill of 
quantities per house etc... This training proved highly successful and enjoyed high levels of 
participation by the beneficiaries.  Due to payment delays Planact pre-financed the beneficiaries’ 
training project by R100 000.    
 
This phase offered more choice in terms of house design.   
 
Phase III of house construction 
Phase III comprised another 250 units.  Construction  began in October 2005.  As at December 
2005, 70 foundations were complete and work was in progress on 13 houses.  A change in the 
housing type resulted in the Phase II houses having four rooms - more rooms than the Phase I 
houses, although the house size remained the same at 36m².   
 
The original number of ten house contractors fell to six (three of whom are woman from the 
previous phases, and who reportedly have proven to be the best contractors).  Another technical 
skills training project was completed, this time focused on the youth.  Another 112 local community 
members were trained in building skills, and have been awarded Certificates of Competence from 
the Santhobisa Training Provider.  This technical skills training project was financed by the 
Department of Labour at a cost of R 600 000.  .  Of the 112 participants, 80% are younger than 35, 
and 80% were women.  All of the trainees were assigned to one or other of the 6 contracted teams.  
As trainees they were paid R50 per house.   
 
In this phase local materials suppliers were procured, and typically each local supplier was paired 
with a more well-established outside suppliers to ensure  reliability of delivery and quantity.  Each 
local supplier was procured to supply 10 houses at a time.  Monitoring and Evaluation was 
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undertaken by Planact through a series of interviews with beneficiaries and other stakeholders to 
help document and develop the case study. 
 
Planact are currently withdrawing from the housing aspect of the Vosloorus project in order to focus 
on the farming co-operative set up in the HSC complex.  Planact feels that the current Steering 
Committee is capacitated sufficiently to continue the implementation of the housing project. This 
withdrawal is to coincide with a major change in the finance administration arrangements.  The 
Gauteng Province appointed iXhasa (a Section 21 Company) as the Account Administrator in this 
project (and indeed in most of the PHP projects in the province). At the time of writing, iXhasa was 
scheduled to take over this function from the Ekurhuleni Metro shortly. 
 
Internal evaluation of the project by Planact 
Planact conducted a mid-term evaluation of the project by interviews of: 
− 50 subsidy beneficiaries 
− 7 house contractors 
− 19 labourers 
− 3 steering committee members 
− a focus group involving all Steering Committee members 
− 3 Housing Support Centre staff Representative of the province and the municipality. 
 
The interviews are the basis for the findings that follow. 
 
Perceived Benefits of the PHP Approach re labour 
The project team sought to ensure that the building ‘brigades’ would be a vehicle for beneficiary 
participation and not just a construction tool. 
    
− Project beneficiaries and local labour alike were incorporated into job creation and skills 
training opportunities provided by the project.  The participants were satisfied with the level of 
training and felt that the training would enhance their job and earning prospects beyond the 
project cycle.   
 
− Training was conducted on HIV/Aids awareness.  Planact trained 27 Home Based Care workers.  
As a spin-off, the community started a food garden to improve the nutrition and revenue of those 
living with HIV/Aids and others who help tend the garden.  The quality of the training of the 
Home Based Care workers was such that the British High Commission and the East Rand 
Hospice expressed interest in considering for the payment of regular stipends and an expansion 
of the project.. 
 
− The strategy to incorporate at least 30% women in each brigade raised gender awareness in the 
housing delivery process amongst the community. 
 
 
Perceived difficulties of the PHP approach with respect to labour issues 
The women who were involved in the construction generally felt that great strides had been made to 
include and empower them, but there had been cases of gender discrimination or marginalisation: 
 
− There were reported instances where women contractors were sabotaged by their labourers who 
resented working for a woman.   
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− Women were seldom heard in open meetings of the steering committee 
− Several men have been open about their apprehension of a woman’s ability to perform the roles 
they had been given.   
− Women labourers were often subjected to poor working conditions, including demeaning verbal 
reprimands, subservient roles within construction brigades, and being procured for work less 
often than their male counterparts.   
− In some cases there were exploitative labour conditions such as 12-hour workdays (applying to 
men and women labourers), which proved highly problematic for women labourers who were 
expected to maintain their commitments to “family life” regardless of the demands their 
employers made. 
 
According to Planact’s assessment “the PHP process is not process whereby micro-management, is 
desired, feasible, or cost-effective.  The provision of gender equity has become a casualty of this on-
going tension within the process; while it is not an acceptable fate for the rights-based objective, 
until a viable monitoring system can be put in place, this will continue to be a salient issue” (pg 54, 
USN, 2003) 
 
Lack of Support for Local Material Suppliers and Emerging Contractors 
The construction process required daily delivery of materials and-or secure storage of bulk 
materials.  Working capital was therefore needed, either on the part of the project, or on the part of 
materials suppliers.  A lack of working capital affected the ability of local suppliers and local 
foundations contractors to be involved.  The procurement of an outside materials supplier and 
foundations contractor was intended to resolve the working capital problem.  It is not clear if it did 
so, as there were reportedly frequent failures to deliver materials or complete foundations on time or 
at the correct quality. 
 
 
Quality Control and Technical Support   
There was generally a lack of on-site supervision and monitoring.  The necessitated the rectification 
of basic construction deficiencies after the fact.  According to Planact these problems “proved not 
only costly, but time consuming and difficult to track in terms of when the problem occurred and 
who should bear the responsibility of rectifying it” (Pg 56, USN, 2003).  A lot of these problems 
were due to insufficient supervision of the ten house contractors working at a time in different 
locations within the project area.  According to Planact “an entire sub-management process is 
needed to effectively organise, monitor, and sustain support for the construction process” (Pg56, 
USN, 2003). 
 
Over half the beneficiaries interviewed complained of problems in the quality of their homes.  The 
poor quality workmanship often occurred as a result of building brigades of varying skills levels 
working under emerging contractors eager to move to the next structure.  Planact established that 
this was exacerbated “by the strained budget which did not allow for sufficient intensive training, 
higher pay rates, or simply ‘user friendly’ materials and equipment which [could] compensate for 
the relative lack of experience of the brigades” (pg 56, USN, 2003). 
 
 
Finance and Administration 
Poor finance and administrative arrangements have also had a negative impact on the project, and 
this also impacted on the labour aspects.  The Council was responsible for the financial 
administration.  There was a significant delay by Council in releasing the first working capital 
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‘float’ to Planact to pay the contractors and labourers.  This resulted in Planact using own funds for 
working capital.  Because of repeated delays in release by the council of working capital, the de 
facto situation was that Planact provided the working capital in the first two or more 
implementation phases of the project. 
 
In addition there were delays by the Province in the release of progress payments.  The payment 
delays raised questions at the interface between community and project.  Planact, as the most visible 
element of the project-community interface, found its credibility being brought into question so 
seriously by the community that Planact believed that the viability of the project as a whole was 
under threat.  The reasons attributed by Planact for the payment delays were the lack of the 
council’s and province’s capacity to process the payments. 
 
Accountability and Transparency 
While the province and council were major stakeholders it was Planact as the secondary support 
organisation that: 
 
− Served as the main project-community interface 
− Shouldered the bulk of the responsibility of the day to day management of the project.   
 
Another problem was “the council’s preferred material supplier and foundations contractor, who 
was not only the cause of substantial delays but repeatedly produced inferior work and would 
routinely discredit the PHP process by usurping the project team and its meetings as a decision 
making forum, and directly approach members of the Steering Committee on a personal level to 
satisfy his demands” (pg 63, USN, 2003).  It is Planact opinion that without a more open process, or 
independent mechanisms for procurement, the PHP process can be open to misuse at the expense of 
beneficiaries. 
 
Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Vosloorus 
Figure 10: Summary of employment creation and skills training methods used in Vosloorus 
Assessment 
factor 
Infrastructure Top-structures Post-completion 
Use of 
technology 
N/A Appropriate choice of labour 
intensive technologies 
Appropriate choice of labour 
intensive technologies for 
home improvements 
Procurement of 
unskilled and 
semi-skilled 
labour 
N/A Sourced locally Indications are that local 
people have been procured 
for home improvements. 
Procurement of 
artisans, 
supervisors and 
professionals 
N/A  Artisans sourced locally. 
Mentors to emerging contractors 
sourced from outside. 
Indications are that the more 
efficient of the emerging 
contractors are being 
engaged by have been 
procured for home 
improvements. 
Materials 
procurement 
N/A  Phase I & II - from outside  
Phase III - local suppliers paired with 
outside suppliers 
Both local and from outside  
(presumed) 
Equipment 
procurement 
N/A  From outside Both local and from outside  
(presumed 
52 of 70 pages 52 
Assessment 
factor 
Infrastructure Top-structures Post-completion 
Skills 
development  
N/A  Emerging contractors mentored and 
given repeat contracts to manage 
Intensive technical skills training of 
labour 
Basic skills training of home-owners 
to enhance their ability to supervise 
No information. 
Investments  of 
resources by 
project 
beneficiaries 
N/A Contribution of additional building 
materials, according household 
affordability 
No information 
Involvement of 
women 
N/A  Phase I & II - 30% emerging 
contractors and 30 % of labourers 
Phase III – 50% emerging 
contractors and 30% of labourers 
Instances reported of gender 
discrimination in the workplace 
No information 
Working 
conditions 
N/A  Instances reported of exploitative 
practices  
Home extensions unlikely to 
follow legislated guidelines 
 
Skills Development and temporary employment  
Figure 11:  Skills Development and temporary employment  
No. local residents trained 
No. local residents who were given 
temporary employment 
 Activity 
No. % of resident pop. No. % of resident pop. 
LED 20 0.3% 20 0.3% 
Housing 530 8.7% 220 3.6% 
Infrastructure 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Social Facilities 27 0.4% 27 0.4% 
Total 577 9.5% 267 4.4% 
 
 
Estimated Resource Outflows on Phase 1 
Figure 12 :  Estimated Resource Outflows on Phase 1 
Paid to local providers 
homeowners) 
Paid to outside providers 
of goods & services 
 TOTAL 
SPENT 
Value % of Total 
spent 
Value % of Total 
spent 
Training 
Training provider 
Training coordination 
1 136 000 
1 100 000 
36 000 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
1 136 000 
1 100 000 
36 000  
100% 
100% 
100% 
House construction 
Foundations labour & materials 
Building materials (excl foundations) 
Labour (excl foundations) 
Project management & site office  
Fees to municipality 
2 267 500 
825 000 
678 750 
572 000 
142 500 
7 500 
698 500 
36 000 
NIL 
572 500 
90 000 
NIL 
31% 
4% 
NIL 
100% 
63% 
NIL 
1 569 000 
789 000 
678 750 
NIL 
52 500 
7 500 
69% 
96% 
100% 
NIL 
37% 
100% 
Total 3 403 500 698 500 21% 2 705 000 79% 
[Source of Rand values – Planact.  Presentation of figures and % value by report authors] 
 
About 30% of the construction costs were paid to local providers of goods & services, mainly for 
local labour.  Figures for Phases II and III were not available.  Based on the information that was 
available, it appears that the spending pattern in Phase II was substantially similar.  In Phase III, as 
previously described, the opportunity was exploited to redirect spending on materials in favour of 
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local materials suppliers. This resulted in about another 30% of the total value of that phase being 
spent locally.  This increased the total proportion of payments made to local suppliers of services 
and goods to about 60%.  The remaining potential to redirect spending in favour of the local lies in 
the foundations. An obstacle to redirect spending on this item was that due to adverse soil 
conditions, the foundations required extra care in their design and construction.  This appeared to 
preclude local contractors from being regarded by the project team as being eligible to do the work.  
Given the quality problems and delays experienced with outside contractors on the foundations, it 
may have been viable to spend some of the substantial training budget to develop the more 
specialised local construction skills, and to boost the local spending to the 90% range. 
 
The training budget for Phase I represents about a third of the total budget.  True, some of the 
training results were not vocational training, but were rather life skills training (in particular the 
education of prospective home-owners in house design and contractor supervision).  Nevertheless, 
the training budget, in conventional terms, seems rather high in relation to the capital budget for 
Phase I, and in particular in relation to the amounts paid to local goods & service providers during 
construction. 
 
Commentary on employment aspects in Vosloorus 
As in the case of Cato Manor, the Vosloorus project, despite some shortcomings, impacted 
positively on employment aspects. 
 
− Labour-based construction was viewed as essential from the start of the project.  In quantifiable 
terms, this resulted in 30% or more of capital costs being paid to local labour. 
 
− The policy commitment to buy materials locally, though not immediately implementable, was 
carried through.  This led in Phase III to 30% or more of capital costs being paid to local 
suppliers, and to the creation of business linkages between emerging and established private 
sector. 
 
The holistic-development approach, followed even with this comparatively small-scale project, led 
to skills development and economic activities in several fields, namely construction, project 
management, citizenship, primary health care, and urban or suburban agriculture. 
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4.3. SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES 
 
The following section briefly discusses the case studies in relation to one another.  Key points of 
comparison around core themes in the report are presented in summary form in the table which 
follows.  
 
Figure 13 Summary of points of comparison 
Issue Cato Manor Vosloorus 
Beneficiary participation Moderate High 
Local labour sourcing High – but some  resistance to 
women 
High – but short-lived resistance 
to women 
Skills High High 
Links to LED High Low in the past, but there are 
indications that an LED program 
is slowly evolving 
Sourcing of materials Non-local Non-local 
Construction approach Appropriate technology & 
contractor support system used 
Appropriate technology & 
contractor support system used 
 
 
Despite their very different scale and contexts, the cases have a number of striking similarities.  
These include: 
− Some attempts, more explicit in the Cato Manor case, to adopt a holistic vision of community 
development. Improvements in the built, economic, social and institutional environments were 
regarded and managed as integral to slum upgrading and greenfields housing processes but in 
practise this was not always sustained; 
− The use of an emerging contractor development program (as opposed to a simpler labour-only 
basis), and the longer-term benefits of this approach; 
− The critical roles performed by the development agencies in guiding and sustaining the 
developments; 
− Relatively well-capacitated municipalities supporting the projects. 
 
 
A holistic approach 
In South Africa the conventional definition of slum upgrading is the transfer of secure tenure, 
provision of water supply, roads and sewerage, and the construction of houses.  The project is 
complete when the last house is handed over.  However, both cases studies define slum upgrading 
in much broader community development terms, in which housing, service and tenure delivery are 
important components, as are other aspects of spatial, economic and social development, and the 
creation of viable local development institutions.  In other words, the handover of the last house 
represents an important milestone, but not the end, of the project. 
 
In the Cato Manor case, housing projects are conceived as important, but not the overwhelmingly 
dominant, element within a larger holistic urban development program.  The variety and scale of 
elements within the Cato Manor development program – infrastructure, housing, social facilities, 
LED and social development – made it possible for unemployment relief, improved employability 
and livelihood creation opportunities to be linked across project-specific, spatial and sectorally 
boundaries.  The establishment of a local development institution in the form of the Area Based 
Management entity is noteworthy in many respects, not least of which is that it is likely to enhance 
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the prospects of the continuation of employment-intensive project methodologies, the continuation 
of entrepreneur support programs and the continued skills development of work-seekers. 
 
In the Vosloorus case, the housing project is conceived as the starting increment from which other 
development programs follow (notably LED and social development).  The Vosloorus case has not 
let the initial absence of  a holistic and coherent development program prevent such a program from 
being incrementally articulated and pursued within the confines of a smaller and less well-located 
geographic locale than the Cato Manor case.  The evolution of the housing support centre into a 
more broadly-focused development institution is significant, for similar reasons as was the case in 
the Cato Manor Development Programme. 
 
In both case studies, a long-term agenda has been viewed as necessary in order to give a reasonable 
chance for the holistic development approach to succeed.  The long-term agenda also implies that 
new and unforeseen development opportunities which arise are more likely to be made use of.  
However, both the cases struggled to sustain this approach and in many cases implementation not 
reflect the intentions – in part because other stakeholders did not necessarily buy-in to this approach 
and tended to stick to existing formulas. 
 
 
Contractor support 
It is also significant that both cases make use of an emerging contractor support program as the 
means by which to develop longer-term employment prospects as well as the vehicle through which 
to utilise local skilled and unskilled labour.  This approach appears to proceed from the beliefs that: 
 
− Labour-only approaches lack long-term sustainability (though they have a high impact in the 
short-term construction phase) 
− The establishment of contractors is an effective and appropriate interface for labourers in the 
project 
− After the handover of the last house, contractors are more likely to be in a position to attract and 
implement new building projects, and thereby have better prospects for the establishment of 
livelihoods 
− The pure self-build approach (used for example in a sizable proportion of PHP projects) does 
not provide much of an entry point for the owner-builder into the broader construction sector 
− It is unusual for labour-based project-specific unemployment relief to be translated into more 
sustained [self-]employment within the original project area 
− Employment-intensive construction (whether labour-based on emerging contractor based) 
cannot be done without additional support funding and appropriately skilled staff. 
 
 
Critical roles performed by the development agencies 
CMDA in the one case, and Planact in partnership with the Ekurhuleni Metro in the other case, 
performed catalytic roles in: 
− Conceiving the housing delivery projects as elements within a holistic and long-term project 
− Investing heavily in their respective technical skills development and contractor support 
programs 
− Mobilising political and financial capital from a variety of sources 
− Shouldering significant development risk in an environment where few others were prepared to 
do so 
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− Committing themselves to long-term involvement and consultation with their target 
communities.   
 
Also critical to the success of the holistic and long-term development agenda is the agencies’ 
mission / vision, the adequacy of the agencies’ human resources to translate the vision/mission into 
the project design and implementation phases, and the agencies’ ability to mobilise additional 
support funding and skills resources in excess of what was available through the housing subsidy 
scheme.  The development agencies in both cases required additional funds to cover the costs of 
skills development and contractor support, and the increased overhead that arises from a holistic and 
consultative approach. 
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5. Recommendations – Opportunities for employment creation 
 
The recommendations, as discussed below, arise from the South African policy environment, the 
two case studies, the experience of the authors, and debates amongst urban development 
practitioners, analysts and activists in South Africa and beyond.  Many of the themes raised here are 
not particularly new, but the authors believe they deserve renewed attention.  In particular, work by 
the national EPWP office has been of use as have articles by McCutcheon (2001), Fitchett (2001), 
Croswell and McCutcheon (2001) who have look at the issues under consideration in previous 
research processes. 
 
The topic under consideration encompasses both policy and micro levels, and the types of decision-
makers are numerous.  Consequently, the recommendations vary from those applicable to national 
policy makers right through to opportunities that local project stakeholders could examine.  The 
graphic below (Figure 14) seeks to list many of the factors which might, in one way or the other, 
impact on employment creation in housing and related processes. The graphic is followed by a table 
(Figure 16) of suggestions that could yield positive impact if handled in the correct manner.  Many 
of the suggestions form part of a package of suggestions, and therefore care needs to be taken in 
considering the viability of any individual suggestion.  It should also be noted that individual 
suggestions imply trade-offs that need to be considered.  
 
There is some recent evidence that employment levels in South Africa are beginning to improve as 
growth rates improve.  However, the scale of the employment challenge is still so large that it needs 
to be a leading national priority.  If employment were to become such a leading priority, then 
actions cannot be limited to narrow fields of activity.  For example, increasing the level of training 
of project beneficiaries and local labour requires project-level actions, institutional adjustments in 
the municipality and province in which a project is located, and in policy and regulatory 
adjustments nationally.  This is by no means to say the incremental adjustments do not have a place.  
In fact, the experience in the case studies does show that there is scope to yield some meaningful 
project-level impacts.  However, without conscious effort by decision-makers to mainstream the 
cases, the approaches and results of the case studies are likely to remain isolated cases.  The graphic 
which follows presents some of the key factors which relate to one another in a systemic sense and 
which would potentially need some attention. 
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Figure 14 Factors affecting employment in sum upgrading/housing projects 
Some key factors affecting employment in slum upgrading/housing projects
Beneficiary 
skills and 
participation

	

Project 
management
Governance 
of project
Contractor and materials 
supplier mandates / 
capacity


	

 Local 
authority 
policy
Local 
authority 
delivery 
capacity 
(infrastructure 
and 
administrative 
processes)
Civil 
society 
capabilities
Capabilities of 
support 
institutions / 
organisations
Competitiveness / 
quality of goods and 
services providers
Local business 
& labour market 
environment

	



State of national 
economy
Policy 
signals in 
documents 
and by 
leaders
Regulations
Leadership 
prioritisation
Technical 
aspects of 
policy
Process 
management
Mobilisation and 
participation of 
stakeholders
Approaches 
to private 
and public 
financing
 
 
Beyond attention to these factors, it is also suggested that stakeholders reach consensus on: what 
constitutes employment, and; what should be done to maximise employment in large-scale housing 
and informal settlement upgrades.  There was little consensus amongst those interviewed for the 
case studies of what constituted employment in the context of their projects and in general this 
could range form informal employment for a day to a longer term formal contract.   
 
Internationally and domestically there are a range of definitions of and approaches to employment.  
In the case studies and in the EPWP there appear to be a considerable focus on temporary 
employment - ranging from informal day jobbing to committed employment contracts for the 
duration of a project.  The authors urge that temporary employment ought to be a standard outcome 
of every housing project.  However, without considerable resources and attention beyond the life of 
the initial housing project, the creation of temporary employment seems to rarely translate into 
sustained jobs. 
 
The EPWP has sought to address this through learnerships that start during the project.  The 
inadequacy of some training and the relatively short cycles of employment have tended to curtail 
some of the impacts that might have originally been envisaged in the initiative.  In the housing 
sector, practice appears to be some way behind that of the EPWP.  Temporary employment in 
housing would benefit by the finalisation of the draft protocols currently under discussion between 
EPWP and the National Department of Housing.   
 
An approach which places housing as one step in a process to create holistic urban settlement would 
create greater potential for employment.  If such an approach is taken, then the number of projects 
that are needed to help create a holistic built environment are numerous – construction projects in 
infrastructure, public facilities, housing – and post-construction the operation, maintenance and 
upgrade of the public (and private) building stock. The collective duration of these construction and 
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post-construction projects will run into many years.  If an approach can be taken to treat each 
individual project as a component within a larger local development program, then much better 
employment results are likely to be obtained than the prevailing piecemeal approach.  This point 
links closely with a widespread criticism that the Department of Housing’s approach has not 
encouraged integration with more general urban development activities.   
 
Rust (2003) makes the point based on a survey of key role players in the housing field that,  “… 
rather than seeing the housing subsidy as a catalyst for housing development, the department has 
conflated the subsidy with development itself.”  
 
[Rust, 2003: p19] 
 
The graphic below presents a conceptual “phasing” of an urban development process in which 
shelter-related activities are not delivered in isolation from a range of other processes that might 
have the potential to yield more sustainable outcomes in employment terms and in other aspects. 
 
Figure 15 Holistic urban development environment 
Placing employment interventions in a context of holistic 
urban development processes (conceptual)
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Recommendations emerging from the policy experience, the case studies and other secondary 
sources are summarised in the table below.  It should be noted that not all of these are universally 
applicable and in some cases they are already matters on the agenda of policy makers or urban 
development practitioners.  However, they do present, in totality, a comprehensive set of actionable 
measures which stakeholders, whatever their point of interaction with informal upgrades and 
housing processes, might gain something from. 
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Figure 16 Recommended interventions 
Area for attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible actors 
 
Housing regulations  
The manner in which 
regulations are drafted, 
interpreted and 
implemented affects what 
can be achieved. 
(i) Annual escalations – Introduce annual escalation of the subsidy 
amount for the unspent portion of subsidies of projects for which 
subsidies had been approved in prior years.  This will ensure real 
budget reductions arising from delays do not cut in to employment 
impacts. 
(ii) Subsidy types - Given the long project duration of a greenfields or in 
situ upgrade project, replace project-linked subsidies with a land & 
tenure subsidy, a planning & infrastructure subsidy, and a Consolidation 
(i.e. house construction) subsidy.  By allowing for a “layering” of 
subsidies specific conditions can be imposed during very different 
phases of the housing and upgrade work to maximise employment and 
the present scenario of issues such as land acquisitions leaving little left 
in the subsidy pot for top structures becoming less of an obstacle.  
 (iii) Subsidy sub-budgets - Review the current allocations of the 
subsidy amount to different project components with the intention of 
allocating a greater proportion for top-structure (i.e. the housing unit) 
and therefore allowing for related employment linkage work in terms of 
materials acquisition for top-structures and labour intensive models of 
construction (This should not involve reductions in other built 
environment spending, but should avoid the bulk of the subsidy amount 
being used to cover non top structure costs such as service 
reticulation). 
(iv) Avoid increasing project-linked costs without making a subsidy 
adjustment.  For example requiring greater occupational health and 
safety compliance in projects should be accompanied by a subsidy 
adjustment. 
(v) Milestone payments – Rework the release of funds approach so as 
to promote  improved project cash flow in order to improve conditions 
which would encourage the participation of SMEs, established private 
sector and NGOs alike, and to align the subsidy payment system with 
the payments systems of other departments and the private sector..  In 
particular consider making monthly progress payments against 
certification.  The present milestone payment places major cash flow 
obligations on projects which detract from SME empowerment 
opportunities. 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, Provincial 
Departments of 
Housing and Local 
Authorities 
Management of housing 
projects 
The manner in which 
housing projects are 
managed can foster 
greater levels of skills 
training and community 
mobilisation 
(i) De-emphasis on fast-tracking – The present excessive focus on fast-
tracking housing-related projects tends to preclude or diminish 
community mobilisation, training, and linkage of the housing project to 
other projects that benefit the same community. 
(ii) Project down-time – Encourage better use of project down-time (e.g. 
while awaiting planning & engineering approvals and payment releases) 
for training and community mobilisation and community awareness. 
(iii) Project phases - Expand the recognised phases of housing project.  
The recognition  that a housing project has pre-project, project 
preparation, implementation, maintenance, and improvement  phases 
could encourage greater mobilisation of project capital and operating 
funds and increases the prospects for temporary and sustained 
employment 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local Government, 
municipalities 
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Area for attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible actors 
 
Housing policy  
Policy frameworks send 
signals to those making 
delivery decisions. 
(i) PHP - Set firm targets for scaling up PHP delivery. 
(ii) Further encourage a more integrated settlement product for 
greenfields and upgrade projects so as to sustain employment creation 
opportunities and to help generate local economic activity.   
(iii) The “units are everything” approach, which places emphasis on 
yielding the highest possible number of units in available space, has 
been absorbed at all levels resulting in products with a diminished 
sustainability potential.  This is most often seen at local level where the 
maximisation of units often occurs at the expense of making urban land 
available for other needs such as recreation, economic development 
and social services.  Policy signalling must be carefully considered in 
this regard. 
 
National 
Department of 
Housing, 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local Government, 
SA Cities 
Network/SALGA 
Matching funds  
By developing an 
integrated package of 
funds model, scope exists 
to leverage government 
resources in a combined 
manner to achieve targets 
(i) The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) has been used effectively 
by some municipalities to create public works opportunities.  Better 
alignment of MIG and the housing subsidy scheme could include setting 
targets for employment creation in every housing project.   
(ii) Where municipalities’ access to MIG funds is limited, some support 
funds should be availed for the design of the project so that it optimises 
employment opportunities. 
(iii) Establish an urban land fund to cover land acquisition costs, and to 
maximise the housing subsidy portion available for house construction. 
(iv) For each housing subsidy awarded, allocate matching funds for 
skills and home-owner training. 
 
National 
Department of 
Land Affairs, 
National 
Department of 
Provincial and 
Local Government, 
National Treasury, 
Department of 
Water Affairs and 
Forestry, Local 
authorities, Dept 
Labour, 
Construction Sills & 
Education Authority 
 
Housing implementation  
Numerous decisions are 
taken at the local level 
which impact on the 
nature of the housing 
delivery process itself and 
its alignment with other 
municipal activities (e.g. 
LED, parks and recreation 
etc).  active management 
of these delivery 
interfaces could allow for 
further employment 
opportunities to be 
identified and acted on. 
 
(i)  Place greater emphasis on the design of upgrade and greenfield 
projects.  At present most design work in terms of settlement layout, 
public facilities and the design of housing units follows a very limited 
format.  The lack of innovation and design for employment intensity in 
the construction/development phase and for the post-construction 
phase limits employment opportunities. 
(ii) Municipalities are already, and will increasingly be at the centre of 
the housing delivery process.  Some will be able to draw on existing 
public works units to ensure all aspects of the housing delivery process 
enable employment creation, whilst others might need to consider 
setting up a unit or employing a suitably qualified person to assist in 
maximising various opportunities. 
(iii) Time frames of housing projects should allow for greater community 
participation, skills development in the project preparation phase (i.e. in 
advance of going on site). 
(iv) Design into the project the longer-term operation and maintenance 
of public infrastructure and public buildings, processes which in turn can 
be used to generate employment. 
(v) Build the capacity of provincial and municipal officials, contractors, 
and support organisations so that they have greater awareness of the 
need for and techniques of improving employment. 
 
Provincial and 
Local authorities, 
contractors, 
support 
organisations 
Technology, equipment 
and tools  
The technology used in 
the construction process 
can have substantial 
ramifications on labour 
usage. 
 
Encourage the use of labour-intensive methods in all aspects of the 
development (including e.g. bush clearance, survey, road and house 
platforms, trenching).  Specifying appropriate technology in terms of 
processes and materials is essential in this regard. 
Contracting 
authority (e.g. 
Municipality) 
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Area for attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible actors 
 
Labour  
Sourcing of local labour 
can improve project buy-in 
by beneficiaries and allow 
for a “sweat-equity” 
contribution. 
 
The use of local labour in upgrade and in many greenfields projects is 
widespread.  However, lessons could be learnt from the Cato Manor 
process whereby a Job Opportunities Bureau attempted to link local 
labour to employment beyond initial contracts on housing-related 
projects. 
Municipality, 
Department of 
Labour 
Materials  
The cost of materials 
makes up a large 
proportion of the total cost 
of construction.  The 
production and distribution 
of materials can generate 
significant longer term 
employment opportunities. 
 
Block making, casting lintels, door and window frames and other inputs 
into the construction process can all yield employment opportunities.  
However, small local suppliers tend to struggle to supply at volume and 
within very tight cost parameters.  Linking mainstream suppliers with 
local suppliers can assist as can encouraging large producers of 
building materials to seek local partners. 
 
Private sector, 
Municipality 
Local contractors  
Building the capabilities 
and survival potential of 
local contractors the 
scope exists to assist in 
generating longer term 
employment opportunities. 
(i) Both case studies show the benefits of using the project process as a 
business development exercise for local contractors who will, more 
often than not, source local labour as they expand their business 
horizons.  The model used by the African Renaissance Rural Road 
Upgrading Project could be useful here (KwaZulu Natal Department of 
Transport). 
(ii) The design and implementation plan of the infrastructure phase 
should make provision for the parceling of the infrastructure project into 
sub-projects.  Examples of methods to create sub-projects include the 
parceling of the project area into smaller geographic units (e.g. with the 
street as the basic geographic unit) or into smaller activity sets (e.g. 
water & sanitation as one unit and roads & stormwater as another), or 
into combinations of these. 
(iii) The design and the later implementation plan of the house 
construction phase should make provision for the parceling of the 
infrastructure project into sub-projects.  Examples of methods to create 
sub-projects include the parceling of the project area into smaller 
geographic units (e.g. with the cluster of five to ten houses on one side 
of a street as the basic geographic unit) or into smaller activity sets (e.g. 
setting out and foundations as one unit, wall and windows as another, 
roof as yet another, plumbing as another unit, and finishes as a further 
unit), or into combinations of these. 
(iv) Eligibility criteria for candidate infrastructure or house contractors 
should include local residency, turnover (if an SME), historic 
disadvantage, and gender – i.e. similar criteria as required under 
procurement law. 
 
Municipality, project 
support institutions, 
private contractors 
Involvement of CBOs  
In being more informed by 
local needs it is likely that 
in an environment of 
poverty and 
unemployment local 
stakeholders will seek 
project outputs linked to 
employment. 
 
Although both case studies placed considerable emphasis on the 
involvement of local stakeholders, participation more generally is patchy 
at best.  This is likely to undermine the degree to which the project is 
oriented to meet local needs. 
 
Civil society, 
Municipality, local 
support institutions. 
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Area for attention 
and 
Rationale 
 
Key area(s) of focus 
 
Possible actors 
 
Involvement of women  
Studies have shown that 
many beneficiary 
households are effectively 
headed by women.  As a 
key part of the beneficiary 
community they are 
equally entitled to 
opportunities around 
employment. 
 
The Vosloorus case study provided some insight into how effective 
targeted support to women entrepreneurs could be.  The PHP project 
also specified targets for women in a number of key posts. 
Civil society, 
Municipality 
Skills development  
Through enhancing skills 
the sustainability of 
employment opportunities 
is improved. 
 
Models being worked through with the EPWP programme and the 
Construction Skills Authority need further attention and could gain from 
being more closely integrated with local institutions and programmes to 
link people access short term employment to other employment 
opportunities within the urban development field.  For example, 
assisting people with work experience in the building trade to diversify 
skills to other fields could substantially assist local labour trained up for 
a specific project to seek employment in government service provision 
programmes post upgrades or the launch of housing projects. 
 
Dept of Labour, 
EPWP office, 
Municipalities, 
Construction SETA 
Working conditions 
Inadequate working 
conditions are likely to 
undermine the 
development gains from 
increasing employment. 
 
Increasing levels of attention need to be played to occupational health 
and safety, rates pay, procedural matters and the like to avoid 
exploitation and contribute to improved labour conditions more 
generally.  Setting local labour charters for projects and having a 
functioning labour committee connected to projects could enhance 
practice. 
 
Municipalities, 
contractors, 
beneficiaries, 
Department of 
Labour 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
Through a description of relevant policies and of two case studies, this report made a partial 
examination of South African approaches to employment in housing projects.  The reflections and 
recommendations that emerged from the project range from broad-level proposals to a limited 
number of specific proposals.   
 
The report found that there is considerable potential to improve employment creation in housing 
projects in South Africa.  This is in line with findings in other studies on urban development such as 
those reported on by McCutcheon (2001) and Fitchett (2001).  However, the potential has not been 
exploited due to the constraints found in policies, regulations, administrative processes, 
management, governance, and human capacity.  There are few explicit policy signals linking direct 
employment generation with housing.  Employment-generation is explicitly encouraged through 
other government departments, but these do not extend to housing policy.  Considerable effort 
would be needed to make employment generation a key objective of housing and related 
development.   
 
The UNDP has articulated the need for such an effort to be given priority in South Africa makes the 
case that, 
 
“Measures to ensure that growth actively generates employment, while integrating the poor into the 
process, require government intervention of one sort or another. They also necessarily imply 
‘interference’ with the market, even if only for a particular duration. Such proactive measures 
require consideration of general policies to ensure that an employment generating and labour 
absorbing growth path is initiated and maintained. They also demand specific employment policies 
to overcome problems associated with the low employment intensity of growth and the weak 
integrability of the unemployed, especially the poor, in the growth path.” 
 
[UNDP, 2004: p11] 
 
If employment-creation was to become a key objective within settlement-related activity, then it 
will probably achieve the best results if urban development minimises the fragmented and narrowly 
framed interventions which have characterized human settlement programmes in South Africa to 
date, and maximises on sustainable and holistic urban development models that are rooted in 
community empowerment.   
 
This point is reinforced in Rust’s review of progress in housing policy where it is stated that 
considerable attention is needed in relation to, 
“… pre-subsidy issues such as land and property markets, and post-subsidy issues such as home 
improvements and community-building.”  
 
[Rust, 2003: p22] 
 
This holistic approach requires far greater alignment of policies, the improvement of regulations, 
and much closer cooperation between government and non-government entities.  There is already 
some movement in this direction, but a concerted effort is required to reinforce this movement into 
on-the-ground initiatives and in particular to empower local authorities to work with local 
stakeholders in achieving greater employments impacts in what will remain for some time to come a 
major focus area of government expenditure. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
ANC    African National Congress 
CBOs   Community Based Organisations 
CMDA  Cato Manor Development Agency 
CMDP   Cato Manor Development Programme 
DOH    Department of Housing 
CBPWP  Community Based Public Works Programme 
EPWP   Extended Public Works Programme 
ESF     Employment Strategy Framework 
EU     European Union 
GEAR   Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Strategy) 
LED    Local Economic Development 
MDGs   Millennium Development Goals 
MIG    Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
N/A    Not applicable 
NGOs   Non Government Organisations 
PHP    People’s Housing Process 
PHPT   Peoples Housing Partnership Trust  
RDP    Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SME    Small and Micro Enterprises 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Cato Manor Housing Units Delivered 
 
Housing as at March 2002  
Site completions 4 576  
Housing completions 4 051  
Cumulative shack relocations 1 110  
Summary of Housing Projects 
 Completed units @ Completed by March To be 
Informal settlement Upgrading projects  
Wiggins Umkhumbane 672 10  
Old Dunbar  245 655 
New Dunbar  245 355 
Cato Crest Settled Area  50 1 350 
Jamaica 180 320  
Nsimbini Ph 1 420 10  
Greenfields Incremental projects 
Chesterville Incremental Ph 1 129   
Chesterville Incremental Ph 2 10 50 143 
Cato Crest Greenfields North 332 20  
Wiggins Fast Track (E & W) 1,040   
N & S of Booth Road 400 16  
Wiggins Infill  200 1 036 
Umkhumbaan Freeway Slopes  200 1 036 
Technical College Interface   200 1 036 
Hospital Site  200 1 036 
Central Housing  50 289 
Nsimbini Ph 2  40 80 
Credit Linked housing 
Chesterville Bond Ph 1-4 751 20 108 
Umkhumbaan Infil 15 20 120 
Grosvenor Road   250 
Cato Crest Interface   100 
Social housing 
Shayamoya Ph 1 320   
Shayamoya Infil   240 
Social Housing Ikhaya   252 
Umkhumbaan High Density   150 
Roosfontein (Social Housing)   600 
Part Hillary   500 
Part Bellair   500 
Aids Housing  2  
 
